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I. INTRODUCTION
Bobby and Esther Riddle, the Supreme Court of West Virginia
conceded, "did an excellent job" teaching their children, Jill and Tim-
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"possibly better than the public schools could do."' Like many
fundamentalist parents,2 the Riddles believed the Bible required them
personally to teach their children, protect them from heresy and
worldly influence, and resist government intrusions that could imperil
their eternal salvation. 3 Moreover, they believed they had
constitutional rights to do so.4 Jill and Tim Riddle studied the same
subjects as public schoolchildren, but their studies were interwoven
with religious lessons based upon their parents' idiosyncratic view of
Christian doctrine.5 The Riddles chose to be "separated from, and at
odds with, the values of the world," the West Virginia Supreme Court
stated.6 Similarly, they believed it their divinely mandated duty to
remove their children from institutional schools, places suffused with
those values.7
Yet the court found it "inconceivable" that children could
"lawfully be sequestered ... during all of their formative years to be
released upon the world only after their opportunities to acquire basic
skills have been foreclosed and their capacity to cope with modern
society has been so undermined as to prohibit useful, happy or
productive lives."8 Allowing the Riddles to educate their children at
home-as they chose and without state supervision-would "lead[
ineluctably to a hideous result." If the Riddles could homeschool their
children, all parents or guardians would
have the right to keep their children in medieval ignorance, quarter them in Dickensian
squalor beyond the reach of the ameliorating influence of the social welfare agencies,
and so separate [them] from organized society in an environment of indoctrination and
deprivation that the children [would] become mindless automatons incapable of coping
with life outside their own families. 0
1. West Virginia v. Riddle, 285 S.E.2d 359, 361 (W. Va. 1981).
2. See CHRISTOPHER J. KLICKA, HOME SCHOOL HEROES: THE STRUGGLE & TRIUMPH OF
HOME SCHOOLING IN AMERICA 5, 15-20 (2006) (quoting numerous scriptural passages that
animate the homeschooling community by stating the spiritual necessity of parents taking an
active role in their children's education).
3. Riddle, 285 S.E.2d at 361.
4. Id. at 360-62, 362 n.2.
5. Id. at 363-64.
6. Id. at 361.
7. See id. at 361, 367 (explaining that the Riddles "perceive[d] public school . . . as a
pernicious influence on the young").
8. Id. at 366.
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Affirming the Riddles' convictions under truancy laws, the court
reasoned that constitutional protections for parental decisions and
religious freedom could not command such a result."
Twenty-five years ago, parents like the Riddles who chose to
homeschool would have been subject to prosecution in nearly every
state. 12 Although there may have been tens of thousands13 who
nonetheless homeschooled their children, they often did so in secret,
under shadow of criminal penalties.14 Yet by a "political miracle,"
homeschooling is now legal practice in every U.S. jurisdiction.15
Indeed, in many states, homeschooling is not only an accepted
alternative to institutional education, but also one seemingly favored
by the law in that it is subject to little or no legal regulation. 16 Due in
no small part to the impressive political acumen of the homeschooling
community, state courts and legislatures altered or reinterpreted
existing standards or enacted new, more favorable law17 such that
today ten states do not even require that parents notify anyone that
they plan to homeschool their children.'8 Given the impressive recent
growth of the homeschooling population, this level of deregulation is
troubling.
Parents who want to teach their children as they please or to
protect them from social pressures and values in schools that they
view as corrosive have flocked to the practice in staggering numbers.19
The homeschooling population has grown by at least 75 percent since
1999.20 More than 1.5 million children are homeschooled in the United
11. Id.
12. Patricia M. Lines, Homeschooling Comes of Age, 140 PUB. INT. 74, 77 (2000).
13. Id. at 74.
14. See KLICKA, supra note 2, at 5, 9-10 (recounting an anecdote in which early Michigan
homeschooling parents pretended to go on vacation each Monday, only to hike back to their own
home and teach behind blackout shades so neighbors would not know they were home).
15. Scott W. Sommerville, Legal Rights for Homeschool Families, in HOME SCHOOLING IN
FULL VIEW: A READER 135, 135 (Bruce S. Cooper ed., 2005); see also infra notes 37-47 and
accompanying text (describing the "countervailing pressure for more stringent regulation," and
the variety of homeschool laws among the states).
16. See infra notes 42-48 and accompanying text (describing homeschooling regulations).
17. See Kimberly A. Yuracko, Education Off the Grid: Constitutional Constraints on
Homeschooling, 96 CAL. L. REV. 123, 128-30 (2008) (describing the clout and organizational
prowess of the homeschooling lobby and the fruits of its efforts).
18. See infra Parts II and II.A (describing regulatory variations and the power of the
homeschooling lobby).
19. See STACEY BIELICK, ISSUE BRIEF: 1.5 MILLION HOMESCHOOLED STUDENTS IN THE
UNITED STATES IN 2007, at 2-3 (Nat'l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, 2008), available at
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2009/2009030.pdf (describing the substantial increase in the
homeschooling rate and population and showing the primary reasons parents opt to homeschool).
20. Id. at 2 (stating that the population increased by 74 percent between 1999 and 2007).
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States, over 3 percent of the nation's school-age children.21
Homeschoolers outnumber all "students enrolled in Wyoming, Alaska,
Delaware, North Dakota, Vermont, South Dakota, Rhode Island, New
Hampshire, and Hawaii. . . combined."22 Homeschooling is the second
most popular form of non-government-sponsored education, behind
only Catholic schools. 23 Moreover, given that several states have no
means to track homeschooled students under their jurisdiction and
that many homeschooling parents "remain underground, refusing to
be counted by state or local authorities," the reported numbers may
substantially underestimate the size of the homeschooled population.24
The social, political, and legal consequences of such a sizable
proportion of the next generation receiving a non-traditional education
could be dramatic. 25 The uncertain and perhaps completely unknown
21. Id. at 1. In some categories, the percentage is even higher. For example, homeschooled
children comprise 7 percent of the school-age population of students from two-parent households
in which only one parent works. MICHAEL PLANTY ET AL., THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION 2009, at
14 (Nat'l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, 2009), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2009/2009081.pdf.
22. Yuracko, supra note 17, at 125.
23. Jeff Archer, Doing It Their Own Way, UNESCO COURIER, June 2000,
http://www.unesco.org/courier/2000_06/uk/apprend.htm (explaining that homeschooling is second
only to Roman Catholic private schools).
24. Id.; see also Rob Reich, Testing the Boundaries of Parental Authority Over Education:
The Case of Homeschooling, in MORAL AND POLITICAL EDUCATION, NOMOS XLIII 275, 278
(Stephen Macedo & Yael Tamir eds., 2002) ("Because many states do not collect data on
homeschooling, and because parents sometimes resist the monitoring efforts of the state,
accurate data do not exist."); id. at 280 ("In many or even most states, however, it appears that
regulations go utterly unenforced."). Some estimates on the size of the homeschooling population
range up to 2.5 million children, which would constitute nearly 5 percent of the entire school-age
population. Barack Obama Could Hasten the Spread of Educating Children at Home,
ECONOMIST, Aug. 8, 2009, at 26.
25. For example, in states with no minimum curricular requirements for or testing of
homeschooled students, it is likely that at least some homeschooled students may enter
adulthood lacking even the basic skills necessary to find gainful employment and support
themselves. E.g., Yuracko, supra note 17, at 134-35 & n.51 ("Anecdotal evidence suggests that at
least some homeschooled children, by design or accident, may not be receiving even a basic
minimum education. The fact that one cannot know for sure how rare such occurrences are is
itself a problem."); Sam Howe Verhovek, Six Siblings Make a Lonely Stand, Minus Mother,
Father, and Power, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2001, at Al (relating the tragic story of six Idaho
siblings, ages eight to sixteen and "apparently schooled at home in name only," who were
discovered living in Dickensian squalor and who engaged in a tense, armed standoff with local
authorities). Further, to the extent education serves the dual instrumental values of fostering
pluralism and civic cohesiveness, the growth of a community that abjures teaching on this
subject and considers itself separate from the democratic collective enterprise would contribute
to social fragmentation. E.g., Rob Reich, The Civic Perils of Homeschooling, 59 EDUC.
LEADERSHIP 56, 58 (2002) ("[A] heterogeneous society without some shared experiences and
common values has a difficult time addressing common problems and risks social
fragmentation." (citing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 9 (2001))); see also Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (stating that education "is the very foundation of good
citizenship" and "a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values"); cf. Judith G.
McMullen, Behind Closed Doors: Should States Regulate Homeschooling, 54 S.C. L. REV. 75, 78-
544
20101 BRINGING IT ALL BACK HOME 545
educational status of these students amplifies the potential impact.
Yet the phenomenon has received almost no scholarly attention.26
Any legal analysis of homeschooling is complicated by the
unclear applicability of parental substantive due process rights and
free exercise rights, which prohibit state interference with certain
parental decisions and the practice of sincerely held religious beliefs.27
No Supreme Court case and very few lower court cases squarely
address the constitutional status of homeschooling as it exists today. 28
Moreover, the standards that can be analogized from other areas of
constitutional law fit uncomfortably and are themselves far from clear
or settled.29
As homeschooling continues to grow,30 the drawbacks to the
interests of the public and the students themselves in overly lax
homeschooling regulations are likely to become more apparent. The
potential that homeschooled children, taught by parents who in some
instances need not even notify state authorities which children are
being taught or by whom, may be subject to educational neglect or
abuse or may be taught in such a way as to render them dangerous or
80 (2002) (listing removal of children from a society whose values and mores they abhor as
among the four primary motivations of homeschooling parents). Additionally, homeschooled
students whose teachers do not provide basic civic or democratic education or who lack
interaction with alternative viewpoints may be unable to participate fruitfully in pluralistic
democratic discourse and democratic society. See, e.g., JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY & EDUCATION
100-16 (1916) (detailing a theory of pluralistic education as a necessary predicate to functioning
institutional and social democracy). Just as troubling, many laws of general applicability depend
upon schools as a kind of centralized reporting agency. See infra Part II.B.2. The efficacy of these
laws and, consequently, the collectively agreed-upon purposes they are intended to further may
in some instances be undercut by special statutory exemptions or constitutionally mandated
exceptions for homeschoolers. See id. Many of these consequences are more fully addressed in
Part II.B.
26. Yuracko, supra notel7, at 130.
27. See id. at 132 ("Parents do have constitutionally protected liberty interests in their
relationship with their children."). For one of the few more incisive examinations of parental
rights precedent as analogized to homeschooling, see McMullen, supra note 25, at 91-98 (reading
the slim precedent to, paradoxically, both "consistently support state [control], while equally
consistently upholding the right of parents to raise and educate their children as they see fit").
28. For the one potential exception, see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1976), discussed,
infra Parts III and IV.
29. David D. Meyer, The Paradox of Family Privacy, 53 VAND L. REV. 527, 545 (2000)
(contending the status of familial due process rights both on their own and when coupled with
free exercise rights are "profoundly murky regarding the balance they strike between private and
communal interests").
30. BIELICK, supra note 19, at 3 ("From 1999 to 2007, the number of homeschool students in
the United States increased, as did the homeschooling rate."); Rob Reich, Why Home Schooling
Should Be Regulated, in HOME SCHOOLING IN FULL VIEW, supra note 15, 109-10 (stating that
homeschooling "is widely considered the fastest growing sector of K-12 schooling"). By contrast,
the proportion of students educated in private schools appears to be dropping. PLANTY ET AL.,
supra note 21, at 12.
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unproductive citizens31 has already led some states to begin
reexamining their existing homeschooling statutes.32  Yet,
homeschooling has proven itself a viable, popular educational
alternative 33 and may in some cases be necessary as a means to
preserve a parent's role within the family as protector and guide.34
Further, given that a parent's decision to send her children to a
private school lies within the "private realm of family life which the
state cannot enter,"35 failing to provide homeschooling decisions with
similar constitutional protection seems both counterintuitive and
counterproductive. But while homeschooling should receive some
degree of constitutional protection, the stakes are simply too high to
presume the practice constitutionally unregulable.
This Note argues that homeschooling must be better regulated.
State legislatures should take notice of the potential harm to children
educated without standards or oversight and should reexamine the
appropriate level of regulation. Most should consider re-regulating the
practice. Yet, the current uncertainty about when and to what degree
the Constitution protects homeschooling decisions presents a major
obstacle to a level-headed dialogue on what level of regulation is
appropriate. This uncertainty magnifies perceived threats to
homeschoolers, provides political cover for weak-willed legislatures,
and fails to adequately protect important interests of parents,
children, and society as a whole. Courts, and ultimately the Supreme
Court, must illuminate the constitutional thicket surrounding
homeschooling to create sufficient space for debate about how best to
strike the balance between these interests.
Part II.A of this Note examines the growth and current power
of the homeschooling community and its success, to date, in fending off
attempts to impose even minimally intrusive regulation of
homeschoolers' activities. Part II.B explores the interests of children
and the state left unprotected by current regulations and posits that,
as homeschooling continues to grow in both popularity and visibility,
the deregulatory trend of the last twenty-five years may well reverse
31. See, e.g., Reich, supra note 25, at 56 ("It's symptomatic of the unregulated environment
of homeschooling that precise figures of homeschoolers are impossible to establish."); Yuracko,
supra note 17, at 134 ("[Tlhere is simply no good data on what and how much homeschooled
students are learning."); see also anecdotal evidence described infra Part II.B.3 and
accompanying notes.
32. See infra Parts II and II.B.
33. See supra notes 20-24 and infra notes 257-60 and accompanying text.
34. E.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 420 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (finding that
parents' ability to choose, instead, to "home school [their children]" serves as a justification of
public school authority to restrict student free speech).
35. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
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itself. Part III examines the current constitutional framework for
parental and religious rights in the education of children, as well as
when and what state interests may override those rights. Part IV
analyzes the constitutional muddle and highlights the doctrinal,
practical, and political problems that the lack of constitutional clarity
exacerbates. It argues that courts, and ideally the Supreme Court,
should clarify the scope of the fundamental parental right such that it
includes the choice to homeschool and the choice to teach certain
subjects in homeschools, but does not prevent states from imposing
additional obligations that do not effectively foreclose those choices.
Finally, it examines how states might re-regulate homeschooling to
protect public, parental, and student interests in education in a
manner consistent with the constitutional standards proposed.
II. REVOLUTION: THE POLITICAL BATTLE AND THE PROBLEMS
Homeschooling advocates long have dominated the debates
over whether homeschooling should be allowed and, if so, how it
should be regulated. Even with growing variation in the
homeschooling community, 36 "one article of faith unites all
homeschoolers: that home schooling should be unregulated." 37 Despite
countervailing pressure for more stringent regulation from a coalition
including social scientists, 38 educators, 39 and child welfare advocates,40
regulatory oversight of homeschooling became remarkably lenient
between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s and broadly remains sO.41
Homeschooling laws vary widely from state to state,42 but the trend
36. See John Cloud & Jodie Morse, Home Sweet School, TIME, Aug. 27, 2001, at 46
(describing the changing face of homeschooling across the country). But see Mitchell L. Stevens,
The Normalisation of Homeschooling in the USA, 17 EVALUATION & RES. IN EDUC. 90, 95 (2003)
(noting that conservative Protestant Christian homeschool groups "ultimately secured
definitional control of home education" in the public and political spheres).
37. Reich, supra note 30, at 109-10.
38. See, e.g., id. at 110 ("I believe that home schooling must be strictly regulated.").
39. See, e.g., Peter T. Kilborn, Learning at Home, Students Take the Lead, N.Y. TIMES, May
24, 2000, at Al ("The National Education Association, the largest teachers union, has adopted a
resolution saying that home schools cannot provide a comprehensive education . . . .").
40. See, e.g., Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Speaking Truth to Power: Challenging "The
Power of Parents to Control the Education of Their Own," 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 481, 490
(2002) (urging states to regulate homeschooling to allow children more voice in the decision).
41. See Reich, supra note 30, at 109 (describing the broadly permissive "patchwork
regulatory environment" and the consistent pattern of "lift[ing] or eas[ing]" regulation that has
prevailed for thirty years).
42. See Samantha Lebada, Homeschooling: Depriving Children of Social Development?, 16
J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 99, 100 (2007); see also Yuracko, supra note 17, at 128-30 (comparing
homeschooling laws among the several states).
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over the past two decades has favored wholesale deregulation. 43
Further, "oversight of homeschooling in several states is so lax as to be
nonexistent."44 Only twenty-five states require standardized testing or
evaluation of students of any variety,45 and most do not require that
these evaluations be conducted or reported on an annual basis. 46 Ten
states do not even require notice of the names of students removed
from schools. 47 This Section examines the legal and political pressures
that have caused states to not "only look[] the other way . .. but
actually change[] their laws to grant even greater freedom to
homeschoolers." 48 The discussion then turns to consideration of the
interests disserved by this permissive atmosphere and how these
drawbacks to unregulated homeschooling may turn the regulatory
tide.
A. The Ascendancy of Homeschooling and the Homeschooling Lobby
The homeschooling movement has, in some instances, been so
successful in securing favorable legislation that it has effectively
"taken the power away from state and local leaders."49 Given the
direct impact of homeschooling regulation on homeschoolers and the
diffuse impact on any other constituency, that homeschoolers wield
greater political power than their numbers might suggest is perhaps
unsurprising in public-choice terms.50 In the fifteen years following
the founding of the Homeschool Legal Defense Association ("HSLDA"),
the most powerful legal and political advocate for homeschooling,51
homeschooling went from being illegal "in most states" to legal in all
fifty 52 in what has been described as a "political miracle."53 Only six
43. Yuracko, supra note 17, at 128-30.
44. Id. at 130.
45. Id. at 129.
46. See, e.g., McMullen, supra note 25, at 87-91 (detailing varieties of homeschooling
regulations, including those that require periodic testing or maintenance of a portfolio).
47. See Reich, supra note 30, at 109. Additionally, two territories require no notice. Id.
48. Yuracko, supra note 17, at 130.
49. Bruce S. Cooper & John Sureau, The Politics of Homeschooling: New Developments, New
Challenges, 21 EDUC. POL'Y 110, 111 (2007).
50. See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 3 (Harvard Univ.
Press, 1971) ("In the sharing of the costs of efforts to achieve a common goal in small groups,
there is ... a surprising tendency for the 'exploitation' of the great by the small.').
51. See, e.g., Stevens, supra note 36, at 93 (noting that the HSLDA provided the bulk of the
organizational machinery in the policy debates and remains the "preponderant policy advocate
for home education").
52. Home-schooling: George Bush's Secret Army, ECONOMIST, Feb. 24, 2004, at 52; see also
Jane Gross, Lack of Supervision Noted in Deaths of Home-Schooled, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2008, at
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states currently impose what homeschooling advocates consider "high"
regulations: requiring curricular approval, setting educational or
training requirements for parent-teachers, or providing for evaluation
of the learning environment and observation of the educational
process.54 Over roughly the same time frame, the movement also
successfully changed public perception of homeschooling from almost
entirely negative to a near balance between negative and positive.55
Also during this same period, homeschooling advocates have
garnered a remarkable degree of national political clout.56 For
example, seven of the approximately 100 interns working for the
White House in 2004 were drawn from the 240 students of Patrick
Henry College, a school founded in 2000 by Michael Farris, chairman
and co-founder of the HSLDA, specifically to educate homeschooled
students; the campus is also the current home of the HSLDA.5 7
Former chairman of the House Committee on Education and the
Workforce Bill Goodling has called homeschoolers "the most effective
educational lobby on Capitol Hill."58  Homeschoolers were
conspicuously exempted from the test performance requirements of
A8 ("Once against the law in all but five states, home schooling is now legal throughout the
country and highly regulated in just six states.").
53. Sommerville, supra note 15, at 135.
54. HSLDA, Home School Laws, http://www.hslda.org/laws/default.asp (last visited Jan. 28,
2010); see also Gross, supra note 52 (contrasting past regulations of homeschooling across the
states with present regulations).
55. See Lowell C. Rose & Alec M. Gallup, The 33rd Annual Phi Delta Kappa/Gallup Poll of
the Public's Attitudes Toward the Public Schools, 83 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 41, 46 (2001) (recording
that the proportion of those surveyed who considered homeschooling a "bad thing" for the nation
decreased from 73 percent to 54 percent between 1985 and 2001 and the proportion who
considered it a "good thing" increased from 16 percent to 41 percent over the same period).
56. Michael Farris, for example, co-chaired the committee that drafted the national
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. (2006), invalidated by City
of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), a law (later ruled unconstitutional) purporting to
overturn the Supreme Court's landmark Employment Division, Department of Human Resources
of Oregon v. Smith decision, 494 U.S. 872, 876-83 (1990). See Religious Liberty Protection Act:
Hearing on H.R. 4019 Before the H. Subcomm. on the Constitution, 105th Cong. (1998)
(statement of Michael P. Farris, Esq., Founder and Pres. of the Home Sch. Legal Defense Ass'n),
at 1998 WL 390275 ("I served as co-chair of the initial drafting committee for RFRA. . . . I
understand the gravity of the problem that the Supreme Court has created with respect to
religious freedom .... ). Farris was also one of only five persons invited by President Bush to the
Oval Office to witness the signing of the Partial Birth Abortion Act of 2003. David D.
Kirkpatrick, College for the Home-Schooled is Shaping Leaders for the Right, N.Y. TIMES Mar. 8,
2004, at Al.
57. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 56; see also Hanna Rosin, First Chapter: 'God's Harvard,'
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2007 (describing Patrick Henry, its students, and its clout).
58. Daniel Golden, Social Studies: Home Schoolers Learn How to Gain Clout Inside the
Beltway, WALL ST. J., Apr. 4, 2000, at Al.
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the No Child Left Behind Act.59 Lawmakers viewed it as "not worth
the legislative battle to take on the nation's well-organized, politically
savvy homeschool families and their organizations."60
The lobby's national clout notwithstanding, the primary
battleground has been on the state level. In "a long string of judicial
and legislative victories" 61 in state courts and legislatures,
homeschoolers have chipped away at regulation and worked to secure
lessened or nonexistent enforcement where it persists.62 And despite
the uncertainty of the constitutional doctrine underlying their
claims, 63 homeschool advocates often show an eagerness to invoke
constitutional grounds for opposing regulations. Farris has stated that
"[t]he right of parents to control the education of their children is so
fundamental that it deserves the extraordinary level of protection as
an absolute right."64 When the District of Columbia attempted to
regulate homeschooling in 1991, for example, Christopher Klicka, now
Senior Counsel and Director of State and International Relations for
the HSLDA, warned officials that "they were on shaky ground because
of the 1st, 4th, and 14th amendments." 65 The proposed rules were
promptly abandoned. 66
From its inception, HSLDA has contended that state regulation
of homeschooling unconstitutionally infringes upon parental liberty
and free exercise rights.67 In perhaps its greatest court victory,
59. 20 U.S.C. § 7886(b) (2006) ("Nothing in this Act shall be construed to affect a home
school . . . nor shall any student schooled at home be required to participate in any assessment
referenced in this chapter.").
60. Cooper & Sureau, supra note 49, at 125. When Representative George Miller introduced
a bill before Congress that some believed would require home educators to obtain credentials, the
response was so overwhelming that it "shut down the Capitol Hill telephone system."
Kirkpatrick, supra note 56.
61. Stevens, supra note 36, at 93.
62. See Reich, supra note 24, at 303 ("Over the past decade, . . . regulations on
homeschooling have eased dramatically and, where they exist, are often unenforced."); Yuracko,
supra notel7, at 129-30 (describing how the HSLDA has managed to prevent passage of new
state laws and alter existing laws).
63. See infra Part III.
64. Yuracko, supra note 17, at 127 (quoting MICHAEL FARRIS, HOME SCHOOLING AND THE
LAW 148 (1990)).
65. See Gross, supra note 52.
66. Id.
67. See HSLDA, Marking the Milestones: A History of HSLDA (The Good, the Bad, and the
Inspiring), http://www.hslda.org/about/history/good-bad-inspiring.asp (last visited Jan. 30, 2010)
(recounting the history of the HSLDA and describing its early cases and claims). In fact, HSLDA
based the very first case it filed, a challenge in state court to state compulsory attendance laws
effectively banning homeschooling, on multiple constitutional claims. Id. While the case was
pending, however, political pressure led the state legislature to pass a law allowing
homeschooling with only slight regulation, which still remains on the books today. Id.
550 [Vol. 63:2:541
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HSLDA persuaded the Michigan Supreme Court in People v. DeJonge
that strict scrutiny should be applied to the state's home education
regulations because they infringed upon both parents' substantive due
process rights and the free exercise of religion.68 The court found no
state interest sufficiently compelling to permit the regulations at issue
to survive and held that, even if such an interest existed, the state had
failed to demonstrate that it had used the least intrusive means to
vindicate that interest.69 Consequently, the court deemed the
regulations unconstitutional as applied to religiously motivated
homeschooling parents. 70
In 2005, the Montana legislature considered a bill that would
have required that (1) homeschooled students take national
standardized tests in the fourth, eighth, and eleventh grades; (2)
parents maintain annual records of courses taught; and (3) any
parent-teacher who had only a high school diploma or less be
monitored during her first two years of teaching in a home-education
program.71 According to the bill's sponsor and chair of the education
committee, Senator Don Ryan, the Quality Home School and Child
Protection Act was proposed to ensure that homeschooled children
received adequate education and to prevent abusive parents from
hiding their children from the authorities. 72 Nonetheless, an effort by
homeschooling advocacy groups, including HSLDA, mobilized more
than one thousand homeschoolers to descend upon Helena to convince
the Senate Education Committee that the bill trampled constitutional
rights.73 Ultimately, only Senator Ryan voted in favor of moving it to
68. 501 N.W.2d 127, 134-35 (Mich. 1993) ("'[The] Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with
... the right of parents . . . to direct the education of their children . . .' demands the application
of strict scrutiny." (quoting Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872, 881 (1990))).
69. Id. at 294-99.
70. Id. at 299. It is interesting to note that the same court handed down a diametrically
opposed decision regarding parents who homeschooled for non-religious reasons on the very same
day. See People v. Bennett, 501 N.W.2d 106, 120 (Mich. 1993) ("We conclude that the Fourteenth
Amendment does not provide parents a fundamental right to direct their children's secular
education, and, thus, the state regulation need only be judged by a rational relationship test.").
In any event, this decision was effectively overturned by the passage of MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 380.10 (West 2005) ("It is the natural, fundamental right of parents and legal guardians to
determine and direct the care, teaching, and education of their children.").
71. Quality Home School and Child Protection Act, S. 291, 59th Leg. (lVIont. 2005) (as
introduced by Sen. Don Ryan), available at http://data.opi.mt.gov/bills/2005/BillPDF/SBO291.pdf.
72. Alison Farrell, Panel Vote Kills Home School Bill, BILLINGS GAZETTE, Feb. 15, 2005,
available at http://www.billingsgazette.comlnews/state-and-regional/montanaarticlec3024b8-
7cee-56d8-ad8b-153f7ad8f493.html (quoting Senator Don Ryan, the bill's sponsor, as stating he
proposed the bill to prevent parents and legal guardians from using the state's "lax home school
laws to cover up abuse, neglect or their own crimes").
73. See id. (noting that opponents of the bill argued it infringed upon their rights).
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the floor for a vote. 74 In written testimony submitted to the
Committee, HSLDA informed the committee that "the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution [affords parents] the
fundamental right to direct the education of their children. This is
well settled law."75 The testimony opined that the proposed law would
not "survive a constitutional challenge in court."7 6
Similarly, in 2008, when a California appellate court issued an
opinion77 reasoning that "parents do not have a constitutional right to
school their children at home"-which some argued would effectively
outlaw homeschooling in the state78-the response was swift and
overwhelming.79 Within days, 250,000 signatures had been collected
on a petition calling for the California Supreme Court to de-publish
the decision.80 The governor's office,8' the superintendent of Public
Instruction, 82 and the State Assembly8a all quickly decried the decision
and the court unanimously agreed to vacate and depublish it.84 Upon
rehearing and confronted with amicus briefs submitted by HSLDA
and numerous other advocacy groups castigating the decision's
constitutional interpretation, the court admitted that it was at a loss
as to the correct constitutional standard.85 Advocates' claims to a near-
74. Id.
75. See Hearing on S.B. 291 Before the Montana S. Comm. on Educ. and Cultural
Resources, 2005 Leg., 59th Reg. Sess. 4 (Mont. 2005) [hereinafter Montana Minutes] (statement
of Dewitt Black, Senior Counsel, Home School Legal Defense Association) (stating that the bill
violated "settled law" under the Fourteenth Amendment), available at
http://data.opi.state.mt.us/legbills/2005/Minutes/Senate/Exhibits/eds36aO9O.pdf.
76. Id. at 5.
77. In re Rachel L., 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d 77, 79 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2008) (depublished),
vacated, reh'g granted sub nom. Jonathan L. v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 571 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2008).
78. See, e.g., Michael E. Hersher, "Home Schooling" in California, 118 YALE L.J. POCKET
PART 27, 27 (2008) (stating that In re Rachel L could be "understood ... as holding that it is
illegal for parents . . . to teach their own children at home" unless they were certified teachers).
79. See Daniel E. Witte & Paul T. Mero, Removing Classrooms from the Battlefield: Liberty,
Paternalism, and the Redemptive Promise of Educational Choice, 2008 BYU L. REV. 377, 405-08
(describing the faulty legal logic and potentially far-reaching consequences of the In re Rachel L.
decision); see also C6leste Perrino-Walker, Home-School Panic, LIBERTY MAG., Sept./Oct. 2008,
http://www.libertymagazine.org/index.php?id=1306 (criticizing the decision and describing the
fierce backlash that followed it).
80. Perrino-Walker, supra note 79.
81. Robert C. Cloud, Balancing Parental Rights and State Interests in Home Schooling, 235
ED. LAW REP. 697, 698 (2008).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Depublished at No. B192878, 2008 Cal. App. LEXIS 548 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2008).
85. Jonathan L. v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 571, 593 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) ("[The
level of scrutiny to which alleged violations of the parental liberty interest in directing the
education of one's children are subject is not clearly established.").
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absolute right to homeschool, the court noted, were a plausible reading
of the U.S. Supreme Court's recent constitutional constructions.86
Reversing itself, the court set a standard of strict scrutiny for the
lower court on remand, 7 plaintively noting that "additional clarity in
this area of the law would be helpful."8 8
B. Problems with Homeschool Deregulation
Despite the impressive feats of homeschooling advocates, new
concerns may be spurring a counterpoint to the deregulatory
pressures. The current level of regulation in many states leaves
important interests of both the public at large in the education of
children and homeschooled children themselves largely or entirely
unprotected. As homeschooling continues to become more prevalent 89
and demographically diverse,90 the visibility and extent of these
drawbacks to current homeschooling law will likely increase. As public
awareness and scrutiny of the practice grows, pressure on lawmakers
to implement more stringent regulations may ultimately overcome the
power of the homeschooling lobby.
A brief examination of pending and recently passed legislation
suggests that the balance may already have begun to shift. In New
Jersey, which currently does not even require parents to notify any
government official of their intent to homeschool their children,91 the
General Assembly recently considered legislation that would have
required homeschooling parents to notify local superintendents of
their intent to homeschool and to submit portfolios of written
86. See id. at 592-93 (noting that, while the claim to an absolute right is incorrect, both
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), and Employment Division, Dep't of Human Resources of
Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990), suggest that, at least under certain conditions, parental
rights might be fundamental, and, hence, entitled to the most exacting scrutiny of claimed
infringements).
87. Id. at 592-96.
88. Id. at 596.
89. See BIELICK, supra note 19, at 2 (describing a 74 percent relative increase in the
percentage of students homeschooled between 1999 and 2007).
90. See, e.g., DANIEL PRINCIOTA & STAcEY BIELICK, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., HOMESCHOOLING
IN THE UNITED STATES: 2003, at 6 (2006) (showing that the largest percentage increase in
homeschoolers came from households in which both parents' highest educational attainment was
a high school diploma or less); Stevens, supra note 36, at 95-96 (describing the demographic and
ideological diversification of homeschoolers).
91. See State of New Jersey Department of Education, Homeschooling Frequently Asked
Questions, http://www.state.nj.us/education/genfo/overview/faq-homeschool.htm (last visited
Jan. 30, 2010) ("A parent/guardian is not required by law to notify the local board of education of
the intent to educate the child elsewhere than at school.").
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materials, standardized test results, and an independent evaluation of
each child on an annual basis. 92
Most tellingly, in the summer of 2008, the District of
Columbia-which previously had, in essence, declined to regulate
homeschooling altogether-became the first jurisdiction in the United
States to enact more stringent homeschooling regulations in over
fifteen years.93 The new regulations require that parents give fifteen-
days notice before removing children from school, maintain a portfolio
of written materials that must be made available for inspection upon
request, and have a high school diploma or its equivalent.94 These
regulations were prompted in part by discovery of the decaying bodies
of four girls who had been removed from District charter schools,
ostensibly to be homeschooled by their mother. 95 This sad case
highlighted the possibility that parents could exploit the nonexistent
homeschooling regulatory regime and use the practice as cover to
circumvent measures designed to detect and prevent abuse and
neglect.96 Despite receiving mountains of mail from homeschool
92. See Assem. B. 3123, 213th Gen. Assem. (N.J. 2008), available at
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2008/Bills/A3500/3123_11.pdf. Michigan, whose existing laws also do
not require parents to notify to any governmental entity of their intent to homeschool, is also
considering putting in place an annual notice requirement. H.B. 5912, 2007-08 Sess. (Mich.
2008), available at http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/2007-2008/billintroduced/House
/pdf/2008-HIB-5912.pdf (proposed bill implementing new notice requirement); HSLDA, Home
Schooling in the United States: A Legal Analysis-Michigan (2009-2010), available at
http://www.hslda.org/laws/analysis/Michigan.pdf (outlining current Michigan homeschooling
law). New Hampshire, which currently requires notice and a relatively lenient annual
evaluation, also recently examined a bill that, functionally, would have required parents to
maintain a portfolio, test their children annually, and teach certain prescribed subjects. H.B.
368, 2009 Sess. (N.H. 2009); HSLDA, Home Schooling in the United States: A Legal Analysis-
New Hampshire (2009-2010), available at http://www.hslda.org/laws/analysis
/NewHampshire.pdf (outlining current New Hampshire homescooling law). The bill garnered
considerable protests, see NH Home Schoolers PROTEST! UNPRECEDENTED! bill to restrict
home education, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-ad5IuC7yDHA (last visited Jan. 30, 2010),
and was decried as a violation of the U.S. Constitution, J. MICHAEL SMITH & MICHAEL P. FARRIS,
HSLDA MEMO IN OPPOSITION TO NEW HAMPSHIRE HOUSE BILLS 367 AND 368, at 1-4 (2009),
available at http://www.hslda.orgfLegislation/State/nh/2009/NHHB368/Talking-Points
AnalysisHB_367.pdf. The bill was roundly defeated. HSLDA, Grassroots Activism, National
Attention Keys to Lopsided Victory (Jan. 14, 2010), http://www.hslda.org/hs/statel
nh/201001140.asp.
93. See Elissa Silverman, D.C. Adopts Oversight Regulations for Home-schooling; Portfolio
of Work Must Be Available, WASH. POST, July 31, 2008, at T.6.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See Transcript of Public Hearing on Home Schooling Regulations: Hearing Before the
District of Columbia State Board of Education at 169 (Mar. 5, 2008) (statement of Acting
President William Lockridge), available at http://sboe.dc.gov/sboe/frames.asp?doc=/sboe/
lib/sboe/3-5-08_Home_SchoolRegulationsPublic.hearing-transcript.pdf (stating that this case
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activists, less than 1 percent of which came from District residents,
the case so "highlighted the need for greater oversight of children
whose parents claim to home-school them," that the regulations
passed with an overwhelming majority.97
Allowing homeschooling to be practiced completely free from
regulation or subject only to minimal or unenforced oversight presents
a host of normative, constitutional, and legal problems. All the while,
the interests in education of students and the state are left largely
unprotected. As the District example demonstrates, broader exposure
of the costs to these interests in unregulated homeschooling, as
discussed below, can incite public reaction and galvanize public
opinion sufficient to overcome homeschoolers' resistance and to
provide the political will necessary to jump-start debate about re-
regulating the practice.
1. Constitutional Implications
States may have constitutional obligations to enact more
stringent oversight, accountability, and curricular-control measures
designed to ensure that parent-teachers provide homeschooled
students with a threshold basic education. Professor Kimberly
Yuracko notes that when states abandon oversight and regulation of
homeschooling, they may violate positive constitutional obligations to
ensure equal access to an adequate education. 98 She contends that
either educational provisions contained in every state constitution or
the Due Process and Privileges and Immunities Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution require states to
provide a "basic minimum level of education" to children.99 "To the
extent that homeschooling parents control the public function of
providing a basic minimum level of education, they are bound," either
as executors of a monopolized public function or as delegates vested
with state authority, "by the state's own constitutional obligations."100
Yuracko further contends that states additionally may be
constitutionally obligated to prevent fundamentalist parents from
enacting traditional conceptions of gender roles by providing
of abuse alerted the board of the "need for us to really, really look at this and to put some
regulations in place that had a little meat").
97. Silverman, supra note 93 (quoting the District's state education chief, Deborah Gist).
98. See generally Yuracko, supra note 17, at 131-33 (stating the basic premises of the
constitutional arguments more fully propounded throughout the article).
99. Id. at 134-42.
100. Id. at 142-51.
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substantively unequal education to male and female children.10'
Under this analysis, even absent proof that homeschooling parents
perform a public function or that states effectively delegate their
educational obligations to homeschooling parents, states that allow
parents to "provid[e] its daughters with educations that are inferior to
those provided to its sons" may violate the Equal Protection Clause.102
However, Yuracko recognizes the considerable uncertainty of
the constitutional doctrine on which her argument relies.103 Further,
she fails to squarely address the issue of what parties would have
standing to bring actions against a state in order to force it to
implement or to enforce homeschooling regulations. Yet the greatest
impact of her arguments, she notes, is not on the courts, but rather in
providing political and positive law reinforcement to states that
already wish to re-regulate homeschooling. 0 4 Positive constitutional
obligations could bolster each state's ability to "withstand pressure
from an increasingly powerful homeschooling lobby seeking to gain
parents unfettered control over their children's education." 05 The
important point is that, if Yuracko is correct, state abdication of
regulatory oversight may not simply be normatively or legally
troubling; it also may be constitutionally suspect. 06 Recognition of, or
even a plausible argument for, state constitutional obligations to
regulate homeschooling may pack sufficient political firepower to
cause a reversal of the trend toward wholesale deregulation and
reinvigorate the debate over the appropriate level of regulation.
2. Legal Implications
Overly lax regulatory oversight also may indirectly hamper
enforcement of unrelated state law, thereby undermining public
objectives that are at least as important as the provision of education.
Schools, whether private or public, "[t]raditionally ... perform a
safety-net function in a variety of areas concerned with child
101. Id. at 156-58.
102. Id. at 158-73.
103. See, e.g., id. at 171 (recognizing that multiple interpretations of the doctrine of Shelley
v. Kramer could produce widely differing results on the Equal Protection analysis); id. at 142
(admitting that the existence of a federal constitutional right remains highly unsettled); id. at
151 (allowing that whether and to what extent homeschooling parents can be considered state
actors and so subject to constitutional strictures is up for debate).
104. Id. at 184.
105. Id.
106. Readers interested in a more thorough discussion of the potential constitutional
obligations states may have to positively regulate homeschooling should consult Yuracko's
article. See supra note 17.
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protection."10 7  Historically, the homeschooling community
demographically has been both sufficiently small and homogeneous
that many concerns associated with the lack of such safeguards have
been either invisible or ameliorated.108 Yet as a larger and more
diverse segment of the population opts to homeschool their children, 109
it seems likely that any detriment unregulated homeschooling poses to
the state's legal protection of child welfare will become more apparent
and acute.
Compliance with compulsory immunization laws is "typically
monitored through the schools," as enrollment typically requires proof
of certain vaccinations in many states.110 Some parents choose to
homeschool primarily to avoid vaccinating their children,"' either out
of an irrational fear of unsubstantiated health risks or because they
"do not wish their children to be tracked by the state vaccination
registries."112 States that do not require notification of intent to
homeschool have no means to track compliance, even if they nominally
require homeschooled children to be immunized (which many do
not).113 Indeed, the last major polio outbreaks and the vast majority of
cases of rubella occurred in Amish and Mennonite communities, two
groups that have long homeschooled their children.114 In addition to
putting the health of homeschooled children themselves at risk, "the
growing number of homeschooled children [also] puts herd immunity,"
the primary value of compulsory vaccination, "at risk.""15
The lack of mechanisms in many states to even know where
children spend the hours of a school day, much less monitor their
continued physical well-being, may undermine states' ability to police
and enforce their child abuse and neglect laws. As the above-discussed
107. McMullen, supra note 25, at 86.
108. See, e.g., Lines, supra note 12, at 78 ("[The typical homeschooling family is religious,
conservative, white, middle-income, and better educated than the general population.
Homeschoolers are more likely to be part of a two-parent family. . . .").
109. See, e.g., id. ("Despite this predominant profile, it is also clear that the full range of
American families are trying or considering homeschooling.").
110. McMullen, supra note 25, at 86.
111. Donya Khalili & Arthur Caplan, Off the Grid: Vaccinations Among Homeschooled
Children, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 471, 474 (2007); Chris Joyner, Parents Home-school to Avoid
Vaccinating Their Kids, U.S.A. TODAY, Oct. 22, 2008, at D4.
112. Khalili & Caplan, supra note 111, at 474.
113. Id. at 473.
114. Id. at 472.
115. Id. at 474. Herd immunity occurs when a sufficiently large proportion of individuals in a
community are immunized such that a threshold is reached (usually 90 percent) at which the
community as a whole, even those unable to be vaccinated and those for whom vaccination is
ineffective, is resistant to attack. Id.
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District example demonstrates,11 6 the revelation of instances in which
parents have used homeschooling to conceal gross abuse of their
children can spur regulatory change. Allowing parents to sequester
children from any interaction with state officials or even concerned
citizens hampers both the state's interest in and systems for
protecting the mental and physical welfare of children. Schools
typically have served as central reporting agencies for potential cases
of abuse and neglect.117 The accessibility of adults in a child's school
makes them "likely recipients of the confidence of an endangered
child."118 Further, teachers and school employees are required by law
to report suspected instances of maltreatment under reporting
statutes adopted in nearly every state,119 and U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services statistics show that teachers are the most
common reporters of all varieties of abuse as well as the source of
nearly one-quarter of reports of physical abuse. 120 Indeed, a North
Carolina task force determined that the state's lax homeschooling
laws served as cover for parents who wanted to "keep [their children]
from public view because the children do have visible injuries."121
Homeschooling advocates correctly note that there is likely not
a "vast undercurrent" of abuse among homeschoolers.122 But this
argument is a red herring. Instances of abuse do exist, even among
seemingly high-functioning homeschooling families. Even if
homeschooled children are no more likely to be abused, because
homeschooling avoids the mechanism that states most commonly rely
upon to discover abuse, it may be used to avoid detection of abuse,
placing homeschooled children peculiarly at risk and potentially
giving abusive parents a perverse incentive to homeschool in the first
place.123 In 2004, two journalists conducted what appears to be the
only systematic examination of the prevalence of abuse and neglect
116. See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
117. See, e.g., McMullen, supra note 25, at 86.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD MALTREATMENT 2006, at 6, 27 (2008),
available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/cm06/index.htm.
121. Cooper & Sureau, supra note 49, at 126. Sociologists note that social isolation of both
victim and abuser is a common characteristic of abusive relationships. See RICHARD J. GELLES &
MURRAY A. STRAUS, INTIMATE VIOLENCE: THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF ABUSE IN THE
AMERICAN FAMILY 87-88 (1988).
122. Jamie Holgun, Home Schooling Nightmares: Vince Gonzales Reports on Parents
Accused, Convicted of Abuse and Murder, CBS NEWS, Oct. 14, 2003, http://www.cbsnews.com
/stories/2003/10/14/eveningnews/main578007.shtml.
123. See, e.g., id. (telling the story of former National Spelling Bee second-place prize-winner
Marjorie Lavery whose father beat her prior to her performance in the contest and threatened to
kill her when she placed second).
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among homeschooling families. 124 By collating reports of abuse,
neglect, homicide, incest, child pornography, and similar crimes from
national newswires that specifically stated the crimes had occurred in
homeschooling families, they extrapolated that homeschooled children
were as likely to be murdered by their parents as private or public
schooled children.125 Given that their survey was restricted to
incidents reported by national newswires in which homeschooling was
mentioned explicitly, they almost certainly underestimated the
figures. 126 Further, though they discovered numerous gruesome cases
of abuse, severe neglect, and other maltreatment,127 no statistics exist
to show the levels of such crimes among homeschooling families. 128
The absence of any effective means to uncover abuse or neglect in
many states, especially when families have isolated themselves
deliberately,129 made any attempt to extrapolate rates futile.s 0
Determining rates of educational neglect, included within criminal
neglect statutes in over half of states,131 or even uncovering discrete
instances would seem impossible in the half of states that require no
educational assessment of homeschooled students.132
Even if, as advocates often assert, the idea that parents may
use homeschooling to escape detection of abusive or neglectful
behavior has no basis in truth, in many states the means of
discovering any instances of these crimes simply do not exist in the
homeschooling context. HSLDA has fought vigorously to overturn
requirements for home visits, which were at one point part of
homeschooling regulations in twenty states, but now a requirement in
none.133 Indeed, via political force and steady attacks on requirements
124. Dennis J. Willard & Doug Oplinger, Home Schoolers May Be No Safer in Their Homes






129. See, e.g., McMullen, supra note 25, at 79 (stating that some fundamentalist families
homeschool to "shelter" their children by "severely limit[ing] contact with anyone outside of the
family").
130. Willard & Oplinger, supra note 124.
131. Amanda Slater & Ronald E. Reeve, The 'Tug-of-War' Over Attention-Deficit
Hyperactivity Disorder: Balancing the Interests of Parents and Schools (and Don't Forget the
Kids), 27 DEV. MENTAL HEALTH L. 1, 16 (2008).
132. See, e.g., Yuracko, supra note 17, at 134 ("With only half of all states requiring
standardized testing or evaluation of homeschooled students, and with poor enforcement of such
requirements where they do exist, there is simply no good data on what and how much
homeschooled students are learning.).
133. Gross, supra note 52.
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and individual investigations in multiple state and federal courts on a
variety of constitutional bases, HSLDA and other advocacy groups
have steadily sought to reduce the access child-services officials have
to homeschooled children.134 More troublingly, homeschooling
advocates are often conspicuous voices decrying more stringent child-
abuse investigation laws.135
It is illogical to argue that homeschooling families should be on
an "honor system,"13 6 exempted from laws designed to protect children
and the state's interest in the health and safety of its citizens that are
applicable to students in any other educational setting. Nor is there
sound reason to presume that states cannot enact measures to
counteract the difficulties in enforcing these laws peculiar to
homeschooling. When these concerns are publicized, they can prompt
swift and decisive legislative action, as exemplified by the District.
3. Normative Implications
States that do not regulate homeschooling or fail to exercise
what level of oversight they retain also have no means to protect the
public interest in a well-educated and civically cohesive population.
Normatively, without mechanisms to ensure that homeschooled
children have the opportunity to receive an education that prepares
them to be productive citizens, some may ultimately become burdens
on society, lacking the capacity to support themselves or to participate
amicably and fruitfully in their communities.
Scholars and critics note that because many states have failed
to implement effective oversight over parent-teachers or foundational
curricular requirements, it is likely that at least some homeschooled
students do not receive even a threshold level of basic education. 137
Indeed, demographic changes suggest that as the number of
homeschoolers has grown, the probability that they will not be
provided an adequate education has risen correspondingly.
134. See Brunelle v. Lynn Pub. Sch., 702 N.E.2d 1182, 1185-87 (Mass. 1998) (striking as
violative of parents' fundamental constitutional rights law requiring submission to home visits
as a condition of approving a homeschooling program); Summer A. Duke, Comment, Standard
Bearers of the Fourth Amendment: The Curious Involvement of Home School Advocates in
Constitutional Challenges to Child Abuse Investigations, 73 UMKC L. REV. 137, 148-57 (2004)
(recounting legal and legislative battles by the HSLDA and the National Home Education
Network against the validity of warrantless social services investigations).
135. Duke, supra note 134, at 148-57.
136. KLICKA, supra note 2, at 156.
137. See, e.g., McMullen, supra note 25, at 82 ('The most glaring potential downside of
homeschooling is that a negligent or ineffective parent can use it as a cover for truancy."); cf.
Yuracko, supra note 17, at 129-30 (describing regulations in Alaska as an example of a variety
"so lax as to be nonexistent").
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Historically, parents who homeschooled tended to be "better educated
than the general population." 38 Consequently, the argument that
homeschooled children would be educated at least as well as public
school students "just because of the one-on-one time working with
them" made some intuitive sense. 139 However, between 1999 and 2003,
U.S. Department of Education statistics show that the proportion of
homeschooled students taught by parents whose highest educational
attainment was at most a high school diploma increased substantially,
while the percentage of those whose parents had more formal
education decreased in every category.140 This is not to suggest that
parents lacking at least "some college" are never qualified to teach
their children, but rather that the potential for a subpar education
increases when a greater percentage of the teachers themselves have
received less formal education. And, of course, anecdotal evidence of
students receiving markedly deficient education from their parents is
not difficult to discover.141
Homeschooled students themselves have an even more direct
stake in receiving an education adequate to prepare them sufficiently
for the role in society they may later choose for themselves.142
Likewise, states have a legitimate interest in providing the means for
them to ensure they receive such an education.143 Current regulations
in most states giving parents plenary control over both the choice to
homeschool and what curriculum will be taught essentially displace
both the decisions of the student and the interest of the state in
138. Lines, supra note 12, at 78.
139. Bill Roorbach, Mommy, What's a Classroom?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1997, at SM30; see
also Lines, supra note 12, at 81 (noting that, though parent-teachers may not have certification
or teaching degrees, "the advantages of one-to-one learning [might] outweigh the advantages of
professional training").
140. PRINCIOTTA & BIELICK, supra note 90, at 6.
141. See, e.g., Cloud & Morse, supra note 36 (recounting the story of a 15-year old dyslexic
Illinoisan who was allowed to design her own curriculum which involved dancing, but not math
or composition). Among the reasons for the above-described unenacted Montana measures were
the discovery of a "mom with a fourth grade education ... homeschooling her daughter, and . ..
[an] 18-year-old home school girl [who] saw her dreams of becoming a nurse shatter when she
realized she was academically unprepared to enter college." Farrell, supra note 72. In an even
more troubling example, six homeschooled Idaho siblings engaged in an armed standoff with
authorities in June 2001 after their mother was arrested on child neglect charges. See McMullen,
supra note 25, at 85. Sheriffs deputies discovered they had received essentially no education
beyond being taught an intense distrust of outsiders by their paranoiac mother. Id.
142. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 239-40 (1972) (White, J., concurring) (recognizing
that some of the Amish children whose education was at issue in the case "may wish to become
nuclear physicists, ballet dancers, computer programmers, or historians, and for these
occupations, formal training will be necessary").
143. Id.
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providing means to vindicate those decisions. 144 For example, among
the reasons asserted for the above-described, unenacted Montana
measures 145 was the testimony of an "18-year-old home school girl
[who] saw her dreams of becoming a nurse shatter when she realized
she was academically unprepared to enter college." 1 4 6 The recent
California case In re: Rachel L. similarly involved a conflict between
the mandates of parents and wishes of the student.147 After a
determination that the student, Rachel, had been abused and that her
parent-teacher had attempted to hide her and her younger siblings
from authorities and had coached them not to speak to social workers,
Rachel asked the court to order that she be sent to public school.148
Yet, following the political furor and constitutional charges levied by
homeschooling advocates, the appellate court felt constrained to
declare that such an order would be permissible only if necessary to
further a compelling state interest.149
Inadequate education may also occur in a more particularized
way. Yuracko describes a strain of Christian Fundamentalism in the
homeschooling movement that emphasizes "an ideology of female
subservience and rigid gender role differentiation." She continues:
Prominent homeschool curricula, for example, emphasize that girls should be
subordinate to their fathers and later their husbands. Vision Forum Ministries, a group
founded by a leading homeschool advocate and influential among Christian
homeschoolers, posts articles on its website asserting that women belong exclusively in
the private domestic sphere. Several articles assert that women should not work outside
the home with one contending that "God does not allow women to vote. 150
Yuracko notes that such ideologies are allowed full rein under the
more lenient homeschooling regimes in place in many states, and may
144. See Woodhouse, supra note 40, at 488-90 (noting the lack of attention to student
decisions in homeschooling in most states and contending this should be rectified).
145. See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
146. Farrell, supra note 72.
147. See supra notes 77-89 and accompanying text.
148. Jonathan L. v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 571, 578-79 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
149. Id. at 594.
150. Yuracko, supra note 17, at 156-57 (citing a series of books available to homeschoolers
by mail order). The prominent homeschool advocate mentioned in the passage is Doug Phillips, a
former staff attorney for the HSLDA and former director of the National Center for Home
Education. Vision Forum Ministries, About the President, http://www.visionforumministries.
org/home/about/about the-president.aspx (last visited Jan. 30, 2010). Note also that the article
asserting women should not be allowed to vote has since been removed, but can still be found
described on other homeschooling websites as linked to Vision Forum. See, e.g., Vision Forum:
God Does Not Allow Women to Vote, http://jensgems.wordpress.com/2007/08/15/vision-forum-
god-does-not-allow-women-to-vote/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2010). Vision Forum also has a
commercial arm selling, among other things, homeschooling materials. The Vision Forum, Inc.,
http://www.visionforum.com/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2010).
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lead to "significantly inferior substantive educations for homeschooled
girls."'st
A more common, though subtler, complaint is that
homeschooling deprives children of necessary socialization skills,
particularly when undertaken for the primary purpose of insulating
children from outside perspectives. 15 2 Educators, social scientists, and
child-development specialists all have argued that "homeschooling
deprives the child of the ability to develop socialization skills," such as
the ability to "establish and maintain relationships with others,...
regulate their own behavior in accordance with society's codes and
standards, and get along with others."153 Socialization failures can
"lead to interpersonal conflicts, social isolation, and development of
aggressive behavior."154 These children may lack skills necessary for
basic human interaction and may be unable to cope with life outside
the home.155 Advocates regularly note that, in many jurisdictions,
homeschooled children are allowed to participate in interscholastic
and extracurricular activities, such as sports or band, at public
schools.156 While access to these activities is undoubtedly salutary in
that it mitigates the social isolation homeschooled students might
otherwise face, homeschooled children are not-and perhaps could not
be-required to participate if they chose not to do so. 5 7
151. Yuracko, supra note 17, at 157. Moreover, absent more stringent reporting
requirements, even the extent to which such discrepancies may occur would remain unknown.
Id. Indeed, in a case often cited by advocates for more stringent regulation, one of the objections
of plaintiff fundamentalist parents was to certain books on their child's reading list that included
"biographical material about women who have been recognized for achievements outside their
homes." Mozert v. Hawkins, 827 F.2d 1068, 1062 (6th Cir. 1987).
152. See Margaret Talbot, A Mighty Fortress, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 27, 2000, at 34, 40, 66
(describing the Schiebner family, self described as "selective separatists," who "encapsulate[d]"
their children "in a culture of their own making" to prevent "los[ing] them to other people's ideas
and ideologies").
153. Lebada, supra note 42, at 101.
154. Id. at 102 (citing Wendy Craig, Introduction: What is Social Development?, in
CHILDHOOD SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT: THE ESSENTIAL READINGS 2 (Wendy Craig ed., 2002)).
155. Director of the University Center for Human Values at Princeton Stephen Macedo
argues that "[i]nsulating children from diversity is less serious than keeping them from needed
medicine, but awareness of alternative ways of life is a prerequisite not only of citizenship ...
but also of being able to make the most basic life choices." STEPHEN MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND
DISTRUST: CIVIC EDUCATION IN A MULTICULTURAL DEMOCRACY 202 (2000).
156. See generally Christina Sim Keddie, Note, Homeschoolers and Public School Facilities:
Proposals for Providing Fairer Access, 10 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 603, 615-19 (describing
current legislation in at least eighteen states that grants homeschoolers the privilege of access to
public school facilities or activities).
157. See, e.g., id. at 632 (noting there is no statistical data on homeschooler participation in
such programs where they do exist and that "[o]ne possible explanation for the lack of a
systematic empirical study could be that too few homeschoolers actually take advantage of the . .
. access available in their states').
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Absent some degree of oversight or basic curricular
requirements, children also may be taught material inimical to the
public interest.158 Khianna Bartholomew describes a California
parent-teacher whose history curriculum includes advocating
skepticism about the Holocaust and the tenet that the fall of the
Roman Empire resulted from the "overmixing of races." 159 In T.A.F. v.
Duval County, two parents removed their children from public school
prior to the legalization of homeschooling in Florida in order to teach
them historical and sociological propaganda drawn from the father's
religion-primarily that "blacks and Orientals were conceived through
the copulation of Eve and Satan. . . and it is therefore sinful and evil
to associate with people of those races."160 It is doubtful that in the
fourteen states that require only written notice of intent to
homeschool or the ten that require no notice at all, 61 such teaching
would have even been discovered, much less remedied or countered by
exposure to less malicious curricula. If, as the Supreme Court has
stated, institutional education is the "primary vehicle for transmitting
'the values upon which our society rests' "162 and "has a fundamental
role in maintaining the fabric of our society,"163 states that maintain
no curricular requirements or oversight run the risk of being forced to
confront a subset of the citizenry who were schooled without even an
opportunity to overcome antisocial indoctrination.
While it may certainly be true that many of these normative
ramifications emanate from an unrepresentative minority of
homeschooling families, if homeschooling continues to grow at the
current rapid pace, it seems only logical that the minority will grow as
well. Additionally, as so much homeschooling "occurs under the
radar,"164 the extent of these problems and their ramifications remain
largely unknown. Yet as those homeschooled under the current
deregulated regime begin to reach the age of adult citizenship, there is
reason to believe that any negative impacts on state and student
158. E.g., M.H. v. L.H., No. 06A01-0805-CV-234, 2009 WL 1124947, at *1 (Ind. Ct. App., Apr.
24, 2009) (recounting the testimony of a mother in a custody case about the educational
mandates of a father: "He would not let [the children] go to preschoool. He ... wanted me to
home school because he doesn't believe in the history of America, because blacks don't belong in
it, only whites do .... ).
159. Khianna Bartholomew, Note, Avoiding Implicit Acceptance of Bigotry: An Argument for
Standardized Testing of Home-Schooled Children, 92 CORNELL L. REv. 1177-78 (2007).
160. 273 So. 2d 15, 18 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973) (per curiam).
161. See HSLDA, Home School Laws, supra note 54.
162. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76
(1979)).
163. Id.
164. Reich, supra note 30, at 116.
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interests that result may manifest themselves and animate debate
about the appropriate level of regulation. 165
III: RIGHT(S) AT HOME: THE CONSTITUTIONAL MILIEU
An impressive variety of constitutional claims have been levied
against laws regulating or prohibiting homeschooling.166 Dominant
among these objections, raised both in courts and legislatures, are
arguments based on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.
Homeschooling parents claim a fundamental liberty interest in
directing their children's education protected by the substantive
component of due process. 167 Others claim that the religious content of
their instruction and their belief that God dictates that they
personally teach their children render homeschooling a species of
protected religious practice. 168 Yet, with one arguable exception, 69 the
Supreme Court has not had occasion to definitively determine the
applicability of these protections to homeschooling as an educational
institution or to homeschooling families in particular. Nonetheless,
several cases dealing with other factual situations provide some
guidance.
165. See, e.g., Yuracko, supra note 17, at 184. Yuracko posits the uncontroversial premise
that "[s]tates have a social and economic interest in ensuring that all children receive an
adequate education. Their political health and economic prosperity depend on it." Consequently,
she notes, legal arguments for heightened regulation based upon the impact of illiberal and
inadequate homeschool education may "have their greatest impact in a political rather than a
traditionally legal forum," providing state regulators with sufficient normative, constitutional,
and legal justification to "do that which they already want to do." See also supra notes 71-76,
91-97 and accompanying text (discussing recent legislative attempts to reimpose homeschooling
regulation occasioned by actual or perceived inadequacies of current deregulated regimes).
166. See generally Robin Cheryl Miller, Validity, Construction, and Application of Statute,
Regulation, or Policy Governing Home Schooling or Affecting Rights of Home-Schooled Students,
70 A.L.R. 5TH 169 (1999) (collecting cases raising, among others, constitutionally-based free
exercise, family privacy, equal protection, vagueness, and unreasonable search and seizure
objections to homeschooling laws).
167. See, e.g., Combs v. Homer-Ctr. Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d 231, 247 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam)
(relying on cases establishing fundamental rights protected by the Due Process Clause, including
the right to direct the education and upbringing of one's children), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1013
(2009).
168. E.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 219 (1972) (setting forth the parents' claim that
the substance and method of their educational practice constituted "an essential part of their
religious belief and practice").
169. Id. at 205 (upholding the Amish system of education based on a parental right to direct
the religious upbringing of one's children). See discussion infra Parts III.B and IV.C.
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A. Do Parents Have a Fundamental Liberty Interest in their
Children's Education?
Two of the Supreme Court's earliest substantive due process
decisions established the existence of parents' "fundamental liberty
interest. . . in the care, custody, and management of their
child[ren]."o70 In Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court struck down a
Nebraska statute prohibiting the teaching of certain foreign languages
to young children. 171 The Court concluded that the law infringed upon
the "power of parents to control the education of their own."172 The
Court reasoned that the "inhibition with consequent infringement of
rights long freely enjoyed" caused by the statute was "arbitrary and
without reasonable relation to any end within the competency of the
state."173
Two years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the Court
invalidated an Oregon statute requiring parents to send their children
to public school.174 The Court held that the statute "unreasonably
interfere[d] with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the
upbringing and education of children under their control," 75 stating
that such "rights guaranteed by the Constitution" could not be
abrogated by legislation unrelated to legitimate state interests.e76
The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose
excludes any general power of the state to standardize its children by forcing them to
accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the
state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the
high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.'
7 7
Scholars consider Meyer and Pierce foundational to the "family
privacy" strand of substantive due process,178 carving out a "private
realm of family life which the state cannot enter."79 Nonetheless, the
bounds of the constitutional protection they actually afford remain
uncertain in at least two important respects.
170. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
171. 262 U.S. 390, 400-01 (1923).
172. Id. at 401.
173. Id. at 403.
174. 268 U.S. 510, 534-36 (1925).
175. Id. at 534-35.
176. Id. at 535.
177. Id.
178. See, e.g., Meyer, supra note 29, at 533 (describing these cases as the basis of the family
privacy liberty interest).
179. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
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First, these cases and their progeny provide little guidance as
to the scope of the rights they recognize. 180 The Court has continued to
expressly decline "to decide the precise scope of the parental due
process right . . . ."181 Pierce explicitly refused to draw into question
"the power of the state reasonably to regulate all schools, to inspect,
supervise and examine them, their teachers and pupils; to require ...
that certain studies . . . be taught . . . ."182 In the eighty-five years
since these rights were recognized, their scope has dilated and
contracted unpredictably. 18 3 For example, in Runyon v. McRary,
stressing the "limited scope of Pierce,"184 the Court rejected a challenge
to the application of a civil rights statute that precluded parents from
choosing a segregated private school.185 Parents, the Court stated,
"have no constitutional right to provide their children with private
school education unfettered by reasonable government regulation."186
Yet, in a more recent decision, Justice Thomas reiterated that "[t]his
Court has held that parents have the fundamental liberty to choose
how and in what manner to educate their children."187
The constant fluctuation in the Court's definition of a parent's
constitutionally protected liberty interest has led to considerable
confusion among lower courts about which homeschooling decisions, if
any, are within its purview and, if so, to what extent. Homeschooling
parents convicted under compulsory attendance statutes in states that
historically did not allow the practice have been held to lack any right
that would support a due process claim.188 The In re: Rachel L.
180. See Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 142 (2d Cir. 2003) (recognizing that, even
after Troxel, the scope of the Meyer-Pierce right of parents to "direct the upbringing and
education of children under their control" remains "undefined").
181. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 73 (2000).
182. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534.
183. See Meyer, supra note 29, at 563 ("[The Court has been far from consistent about
defining the scope of fundamental rights .... ).
184. 427 U.S. 160, 177 (1976) (stating that Pierce "simply 'affirmed the right of private
schools to exist and to operate. . . .' (quoting Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 462 (1973))).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 178-79 (citations omitted).
187. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 680 n.5 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring).
188. See, e.g., Scoma v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 391 F. Supp. 452, 461 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (holding
that homeschooling parents at risk of conviction had "established no fundamental right which
has been abridged by the compulsory attendance statute"); People v. Bennett, 501 N.W.2d 106,
112-15 (Mich. 1993) (determining that parents have no fundamental right under the Due
Process Clause that would protect their decision to homeschool from regulations that effectively
foreclosed that decision); State v. DeLaBruere, 577 A.2d 254, 273 (Vt. 1990) (upholding
conviction of homeschooling parents under a compulsory education statute that set relatively
stringent reporting requirements and required instruction in several substantive subject areas
because the statute did not infringe upon any right protected by the Due Process Clause).
Similarly, parents challenging statutes that effectively prohibit homeschooling have been held to
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decision stated explicitly: "[P]arents do not have a constitutional right
to home school their children."189 Several courts have recast the right
asserted in homeschooling cases not as the right to direct the
education of one's own but rather as the right to be free from
reasonable governmental regulation, and hence determined it
unprotected by the Due Process Clause.190 Still others have found
homeschooling decisions well within the "protected right of parents to
raise their children" and have struck down regulations having little or
no effect on the actual decision to homeschool.191 This type of
uncertainty led the Tenth Circuit to delineate the scope of parental
rights in education only in the negative: "Parents simply do not have a
constitutional right to control each and every aspect of their children's
education."192
Perhaps more confusingly, because Meyer and Pierce were
decided before the Court's development of the current two-tiered
substantive due process analysis, they are couched in the language of
"rational basis" while applying a significantly higher standard of
review. Several lower courts have acknowledged this conundrum.193
lack any right that would support a due process claim. See, e.g., Murphy v. Arkansas, 852 F.2d
1039, 1044 (8th Cir. 1988) (noting that while a decision "concerning the manner in which [a]
child is to be educated" may be outside legitimate government authority, the parents had no
cognizable claim under the Fourteenth Amendment against reasonable regulations); Clonlara,
Inc. v. Runkel, 733 F. Supp. 1442, 1458 (E.D. Mich. 1989) ("No case has yet found a generalized
right of privacy under the Constitution which would allow parents the right to home school free
from reasonable government regulation.").
189. In re Rachel L., 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d 77, 79 (Ct. App. 2008) (depublished), vacated, reh'g
granted sub nom. Johnathan L. v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 571 (Ct. App. 2008).
190. See, e.g., Combs v. Homer-Ctr. Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d 231, 250 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1013 (2009) ("[T]he particular right asserted in this case [is] the right to
be free from all reporting requirements and 'discretionary' state oversight of a child's home-
school education[, which] has never been recognized.").
191. See, e.g., Brunelle v. Lynn Pub. Sch., 702 N.E.2d 1182, 1185-87 (Mass. 1998).
192. Swanson ex rel. Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist., 135 F.3d 694, 699 (10th Cir.
1998).
193. See, e.g., Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 519 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that even "after Troxel,
it is not entirely clear what level of scrutiny is to be applied," but contending it "evident ... that
courts are to use some form of heightened scrutiny in analyzing these claims" (citing Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000))); Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 533 (1st
Cir. 1995) ("[The Meyer and Pierce cases were decided well before the current 'right to privacy'
jurisprudence was developed, and the Supreme Court has yet to decide whether the right to
direct the upbringing and education of one's children is among those fundamental rights whose
infringement merits heightened scrutiny."); Leebeart v. Harrington, 193 F. Supp. 2d 491, 498 (D.
Conn. 2002) (stating that precedent was unclear as to the "appropriate standard of review of
parental rights claims," but applying rational basis), aff'd, 332 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2003);
Blackwelder v. Safnauer, 689 F. Supp. 106, 113 (N.D.N.Y. 1988) (stating, in the context of a
homeschool case, that "the degree of scrutiny to be applied to a governmental action that
interferes with the privacy interests recognized in Pierce and Meyer . . . is not clear to this
court"), affd on question of mootness, 866 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1989).
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Some of these courts, noting that the early cases use "the language of
rational basis," have determined that the right articulated in Pierce is
not " 'fundamental' in the constitutional sense."1 9 4 However, the D.C.
Circuit recently stated that, on its reading of the Meyer and Pierce line
of cases, rights "focused on the parents' control of the home and the
parents' interest in controlling. . . the formal education of children"
were entitled to strict scrutiny.195 Moreover, in Troxel v. Granville, the
Court recognized that parents possess "a fundamental right"196 to
make determinations with respect to the upbringing of their children.
Justice Thomas, in concurrence, phrased this constitutional right as
one "to rear . .. children, including the right to determine who shall
educate and socialize them."19 7 Confoundingly, even in reiterating the
fundamentality of the interest, the Court in that case failed to
explicitly articulate the strict scrutiny test.'98
Wisconsin v. Yoder stands as the only Supreme Court case
specifically addressing a homeschool-like educational arrangement. 99
In Yoder, the Court overturned the convictions under state compulsory
education laws of three Old Order Amish parents who declined to send
their children to public or private schools after the eighth grade.200
These Amish parents objected to the values ingrained in public
schooling, seeking to exempt their children from " 'worldly' influence
in conflict with their beliefs."201 The Court found "no doubt" that
Wisconsin's interests permitted it to prescribe regulations for the
length and content of education, but found its interest in education, no
matter how highly weighted, insufficient to overcome the parents'
194. Herndon ex rel. Herndon v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Bd. of Educ., 89 F.3d 174, 178-79
(4th Cir. 1996).
195. Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 540-41 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
196. 530 U.S. 57, 65-67 (2000).
197. Id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring).
198. See id. (noting that, though six other Justices had joined or written opinions confirming
the fundamentality of the interest "curiously none of them articulates the appropriate standard
of review. I would apply strict scrutiny to infringements of fundamental rights"); see also Cook v.
Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 55 (1st Cir. 2008) (interpreting Troxel as not "applying either rational basis
or strict scrutiny"); Heck, 327 F.3d at 518 ("Despite the sweeping language used by the Supreme
Court in describing the 'fundamental constitutional liberty interest parents have . . . the
appropriate standard of review for claims alleging a violation of this interest is less than clear.");
Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275, 289 (5th Cir. 2001) ("While the Supreme
Court in Troxel recognized that there exists a fundamental right of parents to direct their
children's upbringing, it failed to articulate a standard of judicial scrutiny to be applied.").
199. 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972).
200. Id. at 207-09.
201. Id. at 210-11.
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"fundamental rights and interests" in their children's education. 202
The Court reiterated that the "primary role of the parents in the
upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an
enduring American tradition."203 Yet, in describing the rights
infringed and applying strict scrutiny to the statutes, the court
conflated claims based upon the parents' educational decisions and the
free exercise of their Amish beliefs. 204 In so doing, it left uncertain the
extent to which the case can be seen as a reiteration or clarification of
the rights originally outlined in Meyer and Pierce.
B. Parental Due-Process Rights Coupled with Free Exercise Rights:
The Hybrid-Rights Conundrum
The Yoder Court failed to maintain the distinction between the
parental due process and free exercise strands of both its reasoning
and its holding. 205 Nonetheless, it is clear that the then-prevailing free
exercise standard outlined in Sherbert v. Verner, requiring that
significant state burdens on the free exercise of sincere religious
beliefs survive strict scrutiny, played a central role.2 0 6 This test,
however, was later severely limited, if not entirely repudiated, in
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v.
Smith.207 Yet, even while abjuring one of its central doctrinal bases,
the Smith Court expressly preserved Yoder as a "hybrid situation," in
which the right to free exercise and another, interlocking right were
simultaneously violated. 208 The "right of parents . . . to direct the
education of their children," the Smith Court stated, was among those
rights for which a claimed violation, when conjoined with a free
202. Id. at 213-14. Even the state's "paramount responsibility" must be "made to yield to the
right of parents to provide an equivalent education . . . ." Id.
203. Id. at 232; see also Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 98 (1st Cir. 2008) (noting the Yoder
Court "did not analyze separately the due process and free exercise interests of the parent-
plaintiffs, but rather considered the two claims interdependently.").
204. In addition to impinging upon rights in the free exercise of their religion, the Court
found the statute infringed upon "the traditional interest of parents with respect to the religious
upbringing of their children so long as they, in the words of Pierce, 'prepare [them] for additional
obligations.'" Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214 (citing Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925)).
205. See id. at 234 ("[We hold ... that the First and Fourteenth Amendments prevent the
State from compelling respondents to cause their children to attend formal high school to age
16.").
206. See, e.g., id. at 215, 220, 221, 230, 236 (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)).
207. 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990) (refusing to "breathe life" into Sherbert).
208. Id. at 881-82.
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exercise claim, would incur strict judicial scrutiny under the so-called
hybrid-rights theory. 209
Relying upon Yoder's extensive discussion of the unique
interplay between Amish religious doctrine and the community's
objection to compulsory secondary education, courts applying the
decision to other religious denominations have construed it narrowly,
both before and after creation of the hybrid-rights claim.210 The Yoder
majority itself noted that the showing the Amish made was "one that
probably few other religious groups or sects could make . . ."2
Homeschoolers' attempts to analogize their choices to those of the
Yoder plaintiffs, arguing they rest on a biblical imperative to
personally educate their children 212 and religiously based objections to
the values taught in public schools,213 have almost universally been
rejected.214
At least three circuits have expressly rejected the hybrid-rights
theory, regarding the pertinent Smith language as dicta. 215 These
209. Id. Some commentators contend the hybrid claim "was created for the sole purpose of
distinguishing Yoder . . . ." Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith
Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1121 (1990).
210. See, e.g., Combs v. Homer-Ctr. Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d 231, 250 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1013 (2009) ("[Tlhe unique burden suffered by the Amish, combined with
the Supreme Court's limiting language" rendered the case inapposite to determination of
whether testing, reporting, and curricular requirements violated the rights of homeschooling
parents in their religious beliefs, their decisions on how to educate their children, or some
conjunction of the two.); Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1057 (6th Cir.
1987) ("Yoder rested on such a singular set of facts that we do not believe it can be held to
announce a general rule. . . .").
211. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 236. Some courts have gone so far as to label the decision as
establishing an "Amish exception," wholly inapplicable to other groups seeking to provide their
children with a religiously oriented education. See, e.g., Johnson v. Charles City Cmty. Sch. Bd.
of Educ., 368 N.W.2d 74, 82-83 (Iowa 1985) (using phrase "Amish exception").
212. See, e.g., Combs, 540 F.3d at 234, 250, 254-55 n.34 (countering parents' contention that
submitting their homeschooling curricula and results to state authorities was sinful in a fashion
similar to the Amish complaint by stating Yoder does not "appl[y] to all citizens" and was
restricted to showings akin to the "exceptional" one made in that case).
213. See, e.g., Blackwelder v. Safnauer, 689 F. Supp. 106, 113 (N.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd on
question of mootness, 866 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1989) (rejecting parents challenge to home visitation,
curricular, and other requirements on basis of their objection to the values inherent in public
schools and a degree of imposition of those values on their home education program by finding
the holding in Yoder "must be limited to its unique facts").
214. But see People v. DeJonge, 501 N.W.2d 127, 137 (Mich. 1993) (determining that, by
analogy to Yoder and on the basis of a hybrid-rights analysis, a teacher certification requirement
that compelled homeschooling parents to send their children to institutional schools "compel[1ed
them] to sin," and was therefore unconstitutional as applied).
215. See Combs, 540 F.3d at 244 ("[W]e believe the hybrid-rights theory to be dicta");
Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 143-44 (2d Cir. 2003) (refusing to use a stricter standard
of scrutiny to a parental rights-free exercise hybrid claim on grounds the theory was dicta);
Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Stratton, 240 F.3d 553, 561-62 (6th Cir. 2001)
(holding hybrid-rights theory to be dicta), rev'd on other grounds, 536 U.S. 150 (2002).
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decisions are bolstered by the absence of any Supreme Court decision
applying the theory in the nearly two decades since its creation. 216
Some courts have acknowledged hybrid-rights claims, but only when a
free exercise claim is asserted alongside an independently viable
companion right.217 Others contend that such an approach "makes no
sense" because it makes conjunction of the two claims unnecessary.218
At least two other circuits instead require a "colorable claim that a
companion right has been violated," basing this determination on a
"fair probability or a likelihood, but not a certitude of success on the
merits" with respect to the companion claim, in addition to
demonstration of a burden on free exercise.219
Homeschooling parents regularly argue, both in courts and
legislatures, 220 that homeschooling regulations violate either their due
process rights to direct the education of their children or a
combination of that right with their free exercise rights. Yet it is far
from certain whether there is any real constitutional basis for
homeschoolers' claims, and, if so, what standard should apply to state
actions that implicate those constitutional protections. Courts
generally have been unwilling to countenance such claims, but
legislatures appear to take them more seriously. 221
IV. AROUND AND AROUND: AN ANALYSIS
The morass of uncertainty about the constitutional
implications of homeschooling has contributed significantly to
legislative snarl, undermined ability to strike the appropriate balance
216. Indeed, a search reveals that the only mention made of the theory since Smith has been
critical. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)
(Brennan, J., concurring) ("[Tihe distinction Smith draws strikes me as ultimately untenable. If
a hybrid claim is simply one in which another constitutional right is implicated, then the hybrid
exception would probably be so vast as to swallow the Smith rule. . . .").
217. See, e.g., Henderson v. Kennedy, 253 F.3d 12, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (finding no valid First
Amendment claim and, consequently, no valid hybrid-rights claim and also rejecting the notion
that "two untenable claims equals a tenable one'). Compare Combs, 540 F.3d at 245 & n.21
(reciting several First Circuit decisions as establishing a requirement that the conjoined claims
be independently viable), with Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 98 (1st Cir. 2008) (arguing its
previous decisions had not established the existence of a separate hybrid-rights claim or an
independently viable standard for the existence of such a claim while determining not to "enter[|
the fray over the meaning and application of Smith's 'hybrid situations' language" and, instead,
examining a joint parental rights free exercise claim under Yoder).
218. Axon-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1296-97 (10th Cir. 2004).
219. San Jose Christian Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1032 (9th Cir. 2004); see
also Axon-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1297 (10th Cir. 2004) (employing the colorable claim theory).
220. See, e.g., Combs, 540 F.3d at 244-45; see also infra note 270, Part IV.C and
accompanying notes.
221. See infra Part IV.C.
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between the interests implicated by homeschooling, and led to deeply
unsatisfying lower court decisions. Courts generally have held that
homeschooling parents are not exempt under the Constitution from
state regulation of their education decisions. 222 Nonetheless, the
reasoning in many of these decisions presents serious doctrinal and
practical problems. Further, the marked disjunction between the
language the Supreme Court has used to define parental due process
rights and the doctrine applied at lower levels has exacerbated some
imbalances in the political and social debate over homeschooling. In
addition, the uncertainty regarding the viability of the hybrid-rights
theory or Yoder as a freestanding precedent presents a further set of
complicating issues.
A. Doctrinal and Analytical Issues
In defining the scope of the parental due process right to direct
the education of one's children to exclude homeschooling decisions or
in applying a standard of review different than that normally applied
to violations of fundamental rights, courts have taken several
doctrinally troubling steps. Because homeschooling occurs in the home
and between a parent and child, it is distinct from more traditional
schooling decisions to which the doctrines traditionally apply in ways
that may have constitutional significance. However, in analogizing
existing due process standards to the homeschooling context, courts
often seem to ignore these distinctions or utilize them in doctrinally
suspect ways.
In Washington v. Glucksberg, the Supreme Court set forth a
two-pronged test for determining whether a particular activity falls
within the protections of the Due Process Clause.223 The Court
required a " 'careful description' of the asserted fundamental liberty
interest"2 2 4 and that the interest be "objectively, 'deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition' and 'implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty' "225 in order to be considered fundamental and so qualify for
strict scrutiny protection.
222. See generally Miller, supra note 166 (collecting challenges to homeschooling laws, less
than 5 percent of which have been successful).
223. 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997). Note that some commentary suggests that this two part
test is on shaky ground and may, in fact, no longer be good law after the Court's decision in
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). See, e.g., Yale Kamiser, Can Glucksberg Survive
Lawrence? Another Look at the End of Life and Personal Autonomy, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1453,
1456-57 (2008). However, as the argument here is that homeschooling would meet that more
stringent test and, hence, presumably any less stringent test, this should not affect the analysis.
224. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)).
225. Id. (internal citations omitted).
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Defined carefully, the liberty interest homeschooling parents
assert is the right to create and provide education to their children
directly and exclusively, without state oversight or approval. 226 For
most of the nation's history, this was indeed the most common method
of education.227 Homeschoolers often point out that the Founding
Fathers "were all taught at home." 228 John Locke described parental
rights over children as necessary to the familial unit as a fundament
of civil government, 229 and Pierce itself rested on an extensive common
law history of parental rights.230 Compulsory education and widely
available institutional education, by contrast, are relative
newcomers. 231 Even at the time Pierce was decided, the percentage of
school-age children attending institutional schools "was approximately
one half what it is today" with the relative percentage of students
enrolled in high schools significantly lower. 2 32 Indeed, the Troxel
plurality called the "liberty interest . .. of parents in the care, custody,
and control of their children . .. perhaps the oldest of the fundamental
liberty interests recognized by this Court."233 And the Court has stated
that the Constitution enshrines "parents' claim to authority in their
own household to direct the rearing of their children [as] basic in the
structure of our society."234 Hence, homeschooling decisions appear
"objectively" to satisfy the Glucksberg requirements for due process
226. See, e.g., Combs. v. Homer-Ctr. Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d 231, 233-34 (3d Cir. 2008) (per
curiam) (describing the plaintiffs objection to Pennsylvania's homeschool regulations in
substantially similar fashion).
227. See In re Peirce, 451 A.2d 363, 367 (N.H. 1982) ("Home education is an enduring
American tradition and right having produced such notables as Abraham Lincoln; Woodrow
Wilson; and Thomas Edison." (internal citations omitted)); McMullen, supra note 25, at 76-77
(describing the history of homeschooling).
228. Isabel Lyman, Homeschooling: Back to the Future?, 294 CATO POLY ANALYSIS, Jan. 7,
1998, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-294.html.
229. JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL EXTENT AND END OF CIVIL
GOVERNMENT 55-66 (Dublin, 1798).
230. See Woodhouse, supra note 40, at 482, 498 (describing Meyer and Pierce as
"constitutionalizing the common law powers of parents" and this "power of parents to control the
education of their own" as a "hallowed tradition"); see also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602
(1979) ("Our jurisprudence historically has reflected Western civilization concepts of the family
as a unit with broad parental authority over minor children."); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
232 (1972) (stating that the extensive "history and culture of Western civilization" had
"established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition" the "primary role of the parents
in the upbringing of their children").
231. See McMullen, supra note 25, at 77 (noting that even schools that did exist through
most of the nineteenth century were very unlike those today and that compulsory education laws
"were not universally adopted until the early twentieth century").
232. Ira Bloom, The New Parental Rights Challenge to School Control: Has the Supreme
Court Mandated School Choice, 32 J.L. & EDUC. 139, 178 (2003).
233. Troxel v. Granville, 120 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).
234. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968).
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protection as fundamental liberty interests and, therefore, would seem
to be protected by heightened scrutiny.
However, in a recent challenge to the relatively stringent
standards Pennsylvania imposes on its homeschoolers, the Third
Circuit recast the claims of the homeschooling parents as asserting
the "particular right . . . to be free from all reporting requirements and
'discretionary' state oversight"-a right that had "never been
recognized." 235 The court relied upon language in Runyon for this
creative recharacterization. 236
This formulation has several doctrinal and analytical problems.
To begin, it is circular and doctrinally incoherent to define the right
being asserted by reference to the regulation being challenged.
Whether a right is fundamental determines whether it can be
subjected to reasonable regulation or whether such regulation must
undergo a more searching analysis.237 Commentators and courts alike
have noted this seeming conflation of the two doctrinal steps with
consternation, yet some courts continue to utilize this analytical
maneuver.238
More importantly, Runyon is factually distinct in several ways
that limit its applicability to homeschooling claims. First, it involved
application of federal civil rights law239 promulgated under the
affirmative authority of the fifth section of the Fourteenth
Amendment, not state police powers. 240 Additionally, the underlying
issue involved the racial segregation of private schools and only
indirectly the educational choices of parents;241 the suit was brought
by the parents of two black students against several private schools.242
235. Combs v. Homer-Ctr. Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d 231, 247 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 129 S. Ct. 1013 (2009).
236. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 178 (1976) ("(Parents] have no constitutional right to
provide their children with . . . education unfettered by reasonable government regulation."),
quoted in Combs, 540 F.3d at 248.
237. See 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE & PROCEDURE § 15.5 (4th ed. 2007) (stating that, though there remains a great deal
of uncertainty, "significant impairment" of fundamental rights is generally the trigger for strict
scrutiny).
238. See, e.g., Meyer, supra note 29, at 547 ("[The Supreme Court's tendency to reduce
parent-state conflicts to a question of 'reasonableness' has left a number of lower federal judges
scratching their heads and wondering out loud whether there really is a 'fundamental right' of
parents. . . .").
239. Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006); Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2006); see Runyon, 427 U.S. at 164, 175-79 (finding that application of the
civil rights law did not impinge on parent's protected liberty interests in choosing private
education or choosing specialized instruction).
240. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 171-73.
241. Id. at 163.
242. Id. at 163-66.
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Indeed, the basis of the factual distinction, and potentially the
constitutional distinction, is explicit in the opinion. The Court noted
that, as there was no effect on the parents' right "to send their
children to a particular private school" or on the "subject matter which
is taught," "no parental right" under the Constitution was
implicated. 243 Further, parental rights "may be no more than verbal
variations" of the privacy right,244 and the statute in question did "not
represent governmental intrusion into the privacy of the home" or the
parent-child relationship. 245
By contrast, the statute at issue in Combs was state law not
enacted under any specific constitutional grant of authority. 246 It
directly affected parental choices and the implementation of
educational decisions by requiring that homeschooling parents submit
evidence of their plans and progress to their local superintendent.
Subsequently, the superintendent, upon finding that an "appropriate
education [was not] taking place," could override their choice to
homeschool, leaving them to face criminal prosecution if they failed to
comply. 24 7 The statute operated within the home as the homeschoolers'
place of education and directly affected the parent-child relationship,
rather than governing institutional policy, as was the case in
Runyon. 248 It determined the subject matter to be taught, and parents
who failed to strictly comply, in the view of the local superintendent,
could find their homeschooling choices overridden by state policy. 249
Hence, regardless of whether the claimed liberty interest is
characterized as spatial (within the home),250 relational (as between
243. Id. at 177.
244. Id. at 179 n.15.
245. Id. at 178.
246. See Combs v. Homer-Ctr. Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d 231, 250 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 129 S. Ct. 1013 (2009) (discussing the reporting and review requirements of
Pennsylvania's compulsory education law challenged by the plaintiffs).
247. Act 169, 24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 13-1327.1 (2006). The statute requires that parents
maintain a portfolio of materials including a log of any reading materials, samples of writing,
and workbooks; submit an affidavit outlining their educational plans; teach certain designated
subjects; provide immunization records; submit to outside standardized testing; and submit their
children to annual evaluations of education progress made by a psychologist or institutional
school official. Id. The statute requires annual submission of the material in the portfolio, test
scores, and evaluation to the local superintendent. Id. If not satisfied, the superintendent can
enroll the student in a school. Id.
248. Compare id., with Runyon, 427 U.S. at 163 ("The principal issue presented . . . is
whether a federal law, namely, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, prohibits private schools from excluding
qualified children solely because they are Negroes.").
249. See 24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 13-1327. 1.
250. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) (stating that the opinion rested in
part on "liberty of the person . . . in its spatial . .. dimensions").
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family members), 251 or as a special weight to be granted parental
choice,252 these regulations would appear to have a much more direct
and constitutionally relevant impact. The Third Circuit's recast of the
parents' claims as asserting a "constitutional right to avoid reasonable
state regulation" lacking "[]sufficient constitutional dimension"253
perverts the constitutional doctrine and warps Runyon beyond its
breaking point.
B. Practical Issues
A host of practical problems accompanies the current legal
uncertainty about the due process rights of homeschooling parents. On
the one hand, leaving parental interests in home education outside the
"tortuous and bizarre" boundaries of the fundamental right 254 or
recasting them so as to leave their curtailment subject only to rational
basis scrutiny seriously undermines autonomy, granting government
authority "to indoctrinate other people's children. . . ."255 On the other,
granting parental decisions broad constitutional imprimatur would
hamstring state efforts to protect both children themselves and
important societal interests in proper child-rearing and education.256
The lack of clear constitutional protections for homeschooling
parents threatens to deprive children of the real and substantial
benefits a homeschool education can provide. Many homeschooling
parents argue homeschooling protects their children from the
"negative socialization" that occurs in institutional educational
atmospheres, which can be severely detrimental to the learning
process.257 Further, the available data, though perhaps marred by
251. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (stating that the right of privacy
may be inherent in a protected family relationship).
252. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 69 (2000) (stating that the constitutional
violation occurred when the parent's "determination of her daughter's best interests" were given
"no special weight").
253. Combs v. Homer-Ctr. Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d 231, 249 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 129 S. Ct. 1013 (2009).
254. Meyer, supra note 29, at 562.
255. See Richard W. Garnett, Taking Pierce Seriously: The Family, Religious Education, and
Harm to Children, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 109, 130-33 (2000) (arguing Pierce should be seen as
affirming the liberal value of citizens' autonomy and that pursuit of that ideal requires that
society restrict its impulse to require parents submit their children to the government for civic
teaching).
256. Woodhouse, supra note 40, at 484 (dubbing these problems the "dark side of parental
rights").
257. See MICHAEL FARRIS, THE FUTURE OF HOME SCHOOLING: A NEW DIRECTION FOR
CHRISTIAN HOME EDUCATION 123-24 (1997) (noting that children are confronted with social
pressure and distractions such as early sexualization, drugs, alcohol, and violence); see also L.W.
v. McComb Separate Mun. Sch. Dist., 754 So. 2d 1136, 1137, 1145 (Miss. 1999) (finding state
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selection biases and the difficulty of tracking homeschoolers, 258
suggest homeschoolers score at least as well as public school students
on standardized tests.259 Homeschooled children, advocates argue,
have "systemic and fundamental" advantages: homeschool educators
deal with smaller class sizes and thus can provide a more hands-on
approach to teaching, are able to more easily adapt their methods to
the particular characteristics of the student, and have personal, rather
than professional, incentives to educate each student.260 While no
state has functionally prohibited homeschooling in over a decade,
some worried the above-discussed (and now de-published) California
appellate case261 briefly did just that.262
Further, the rights recognized in Meyer and Pierce serve as a
crucial bulwark of liberalism "hailed by modern scholars as standing
for a commitment to pluralism and the proposition that individuals
must be free to 'heed the music of different drummers.' "263 The Pierce
and Yoder opinions forcefully undergird this conception: "A way of life
that is odd or even erratic . . . is not to be condemned because it is
different."264 Justice Thomas has implied that the availability of a
choice among alternatives is a crucial element of the balance of rights
between states as providers of public education, children, and
liable for negligent supervision to public school student sexually and physically assaulted by
other students at public school).
258. See McMullen, supra note 25, at 84-85 (noting the real concern that what data exists
about the adequacy of homeschooling is subject to possibly fatal selection biases because "one
suspects the better students are the ones volunteering to [take tests]"); Reich, supra note 30, at
116 (because so much homeschooling occurs under the radar, even if researchers and public
officials "wished to test or monitor the[ir] progress ... they would not even know how to locate
them").
259. See Yuracko, supra note 17, at 134 & nn.47-50 (citing studies showing homeschoolers
scoring significantly higher than average on the SAT, ACT, and Iowa Basic Skills tests, but
noting the problems inherent in the data); see also Lines, supra note 12, at 82 (stating that
studies show homeschooled children "score above average, sometimes well above average" on
standardized tests). In some cases, homeschooled students have higher acceptance rates at top
colleges. Rebecca Winters, From Home to Harvard, TIME, Sep. 11, 2001, at 55.
260. See Bruce D. Page, Note, Changing Our Perspective: How Presumptive Invalidity of
Home School Regulations Will Further the State's Interest in an Educated Citizenry, 14 REGENT
U. L. REV. 181, 193-94 (2002) (outlining the instrumental benefits of homeschooling); see also
Stevens, supra note 36, at 94 (stating that homeschoolers tend to be more civically active than
their public school counterparts).
261. In re Rachel L., 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d 77, 79 (Ct. App. 2008) (depublished), vacated, reh'g
granted sub. nom. Jonathan L. v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 571 (Ct. App. 2008); see supra
notes 77-81, 147-49 and accompanying text.
262. See, e.g., Hersher, supra note 78, at 27 (stating that In re Rachel L could be understood
"as holding that it is illegal for parents ... to teach their own children at home').
263. Woodhouse, supra note 40, at 483 (quoting LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-6, at 1319 (2d ed. 1988)).
264. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 224 (1972).
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parents. 265 Also, as scholars have noted, a determination that a
claimed constitutional right to make certain family choices is outside
the scope of family privacy or parental rights effectively denigrates
those choices, stamping them with a mark of social inferiority
alongside the constitutional inferiority.266 A current and potentially
troubling manifestation of this denigration can be seen in recent
custody decisions that suggest a parent's decision to homeschool can
weigh against that parent.267
Yet, fully affording parents' choices to homeschool and how to
homeschool fundamental liberty interest status would require that all
homeschooling regulations survive strict scrutiny-that they serve a
compelling state interest using the least restrictive means available.268
This conclusion could have dire consequences. States would be
severely restricted in the means at their disposal to protect child
welfare and promote an educated, productive citizenry. Further, states
would find it difficult to provide students themselves with any
effective recourse if their parents' educational methodology deprived
them of the freedom to chart their own futures.269
While a state may be able to show that protecting the safety of
children is a compelling interest, it may be difficult to show that home
265. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 419-20 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that
schools' authority over student speech is justified in part by parental ability to opt out by, among
other things, "send[ing] their children to private schools or home school[ing] them").
266. See Meyer, supra note 29, at 565-68 (describing the destructive social, familial, and
legal impact of "sorting" privacy-rights claims into a "hierarchy" that "may inflict a very
substantial injury on those it denigrates" by declaring certain family decisions and relationships
not "worthy of 'traditional respect in our society' ").
267. See, e.g., Donna G.R. v. James B.R., 877 So. 2d 1164, 1168-69 (La. Ct. App. 2004)
(finding that homeschooling was not in the best interests of the children); Anderson v. Anderson,
56 S.W.3d 5, 9 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (same); N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. F.P., No. FG-
02-65-06, 2007 WL 1753553, at *2-3 (N.J. Super. App. Div., June 20, 2007) ("F.P. argues,
however, that she has a constitutional and statutory right to choose the educational plan for her
child . . . . F.P. asserts that the Division does not have the right to seek termination of parental
rights because of its view that an educational plan other than home schooling would be better for
the child. We disagree."), cert. denied, 937 A.2d 979 (N.J. 2007). Compare, e.g., Taylor v. Taylor,
758 N.W.2d 243, 243 (Mich. 2008) (denying leave to appeal trial court order to send child
involved in custody proceeding to public school), with id. (Markman, J., dissenting) (noting the
trial court's decision showed a "predisposition that ... public schooling is invariably preferable to
homeschooling. . . .").
268. This is the traditional formulation of strict scrutiny applied to state actions that
infringe on fundamental liberty interests. See, e.g., 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK,
TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE & PROCEDURE § 15.5 (4th ed. 2007).
269. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 86 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that in
cases of the exercise of parental authority there "is at a minimum a third individual, whose
interests are implicated . . . [:] the child"); see also Yoder, 406 U.S. at 244-45 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) ("While the parents, absent dissent, normally speak for the entire family, the
education of the child is a matter on which the child will often have decided views.").
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visits, for example, are necessary to protecting that interest. 270 The
Yoder Court acknowledged Wisconsin's strong interest in providing
equal access to secondary education in order to prevent children from
"becom[ing] burdens on society because of educational short-
comings." 271 But reporting, standardized testing, and curricular
requirements, as well as mechanisms to ensure compliance, do
infringe on the autonomy of a parent's educational decisions. Hence,
regulations implementing such requirements could be determined
constitutionally unsound. Pierce recognized the importance of
requiring "that certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship ...
be taught, and that nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to
the public welfare," 272 yet how states could ensure a basic civic
curriculum consistent with strict scrutiny is far from clear. Similarly,
if registration and reporting requirements infringe on parental
decisions, states may have no means to ensure that children receive
proper vaccinations, a problem with potentially significant impacts on
public health.273
Additionally, granting parents plenary authority to make
educational determinations threatens to infringe upon the rights of
the children themselves. In his Yoder dissent, Justice Douglas noted
that "[i]t is the future of the student, not the future of the parents,
that is imperiled" by giving parents full power to determine the
student's education. 274 He argued that an overly comprehensive
parental right could allow parents to render their child's own chosen
goals forever beyond reach, leaving "his entire life . .. stunted and
deformed."275 Commentators have noted that this area of
constitutional jurisprudence, perhaps more than any other, "often
pose[s] a clash between conflicting individual rights" and "resolving
270. See, e.g., Brunelle v. Lynn Pub. Sch., 702 N.E.2d 1182, 1184-87 (Mass. 1998)
(invalidating home visit requirement as infringing on the "basic constitutional right of parents to
direct the education of their children," in a way not "essential to protection of the State's interest
in seeing that children receive an education"); see also Woodhouse, supra note 40, at 488-90
(recounting the case of two boys removed from school even after their teachers reported bruises
to child protection authorities because their father asserted a "right to homeschool" and
authorities, consequently, "felt they had no choice but to capitulate;" the boys subsequently killed
their father, feeling they had "no other option but to kill or be killed" and ultimately plead guilty
to manslaughter because they could not face "the trauma of reliving their story in open court").
271. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 224.
272. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925).
273. See generally Khalili & Caplan, supra note 111, at 471-76 (discussing the difficulty of
tracking homeschooling children and enforcing existing vaccination requirements and the
possibility this could contribute to epidemics).
274. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 245 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
275. Id. at 246.
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one claim necessarily conclude[s] the other."2 7 6 Without clarity as to
the scope and nature of the parental rights implicated in
homeschooling decisions, the instances in which those rights should be
constitutionally protected or should instead yield to societal or student
interests cannot be coherently determined.
C. Political Issues
The lack of clarity in the Supreme Court's definition of parental
rights also may have exacerbated or even caused malfunctions in the
political process that have led to harmful deregulation of
homeschooling. "[B]y its exaggerated rhetoric about the Constitution's
service of 'family autonomy' and its insistent adherence to the illusion
of traditional fundamental-rights strict scrutiny," the Court has
simultaneously given rhetorical fodder to homeschooling advocates
and left them feeling persecuted when court decisions, as they often
do, fail to vindicate their claims.277 Courts and commentators alike
have noted that, "[d]espite the sweeping language"278 and "near-
absolutist pronouncements" 279 the Court has often used to describe the
parental right, "there is an important and unfortunate disjunction
between what the Court says ... and how it actually goes about
protecting [the] right[] in real cases."2 8 0 While courts charged with
applying the seeming inconsistency between rhetoric and practice
admit to being flummoxed, advocates and legislators are charged with
forming and promulgating sound homeschooling policy under an
inscrutable constitutional cloud.
At least one model of how political actors interact to create
legal rules demonstrates how this constitutional uncertainty may
skew the regulations ultimately produced. Public choice theory posits
that small, intensely interested groups have organizational
advantages that allow them to exert disproportionate influence on
politicians and to secure laws benefiting them to the detriment of
society at large.281 Larger groups upon whom the impact of legislation
will be relatively minor or not readily apparent face collective-action
problems that leave them effectively underrepresented. 282 Legislators
276. Meyer, supra note 29, at 551-53.
277. Id. at 558.
278. Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 519 (7th Cir. 2003).
279. Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 304 (3d Cir. 2000).
280. Meyer, supra note 29, at 529.
281. See Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial
Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 37-43 (1991) (outlining the basic tenets of public choice theory).
282. See id. (further outlining pubic choice theory).
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rationally will author and support legislation that maximizes their
political support.283 This suggests that legal change "is likely to harm
the general public" when concentrated benefits accrue to some, but
harms, even if greater in the aggregate, accrue only diffusely.
Similarly, legal change may fail to occur even though benefits
outweigh costs when those costs are borne by a small, vigorous
interest group. 284
As discussed in Part II.A, homeschoolers have been described
as having one of the most powerful educational lobbying machines in
the country. 285 In legislative contests in state houses across the
country, they regularly deploy the Court's unqualified statements of
parental rights to oppose even the most basic homeschooling
regulation. 286 An example of the potential impact can be seen in the
previously discussed Montana Senate bill.2 87 In statement after
statement, homeschoolers and advocates. opined to the education
committee that the proposed bill was unconstitutional, 288 though its
effect, in fact, would have been relatively slight.289 At the close of the
283. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 50, 68 (1987) (describing
politicians' incentives under this theory of legislation).
284. See, e.g., OLSON, supra note 50, at 3 (describing the "surprising tendency for the
exploitation' of the great by the small" in legislative battles).
285. See supra Part II.A; see also McMullen, supra note 25, at 99 (describing the ferocity of
the homeschooling lobby as a bar to new homeschooling regulation).
286. See, e.g., KLICKA, supra note 2, at 155-78 (detailing dozens of legislative battles, most of
which directly involved assertions of Fourteenth Amendment rights); Proposed Nebraska
Homeschooling Bill: Hearing on L.B. 1141 Before the Comm. on Educ., 100th Leg., 2d Sess. 21-22
(Neb. 2008) (statement of Michael Donnelly, Staff Attorney, Home School Legal Defense
Association, Adjunct Professor of Constitutional Law, Patrick Henry College) (quoting from both
Pierce and Yoder in opposition to bill requiring annual standardized testing), available at
http://uniweb.legislature.ne.gov/FloorDocs/100/PDF/Transcripts/Education/2008-02-26.pdf, id. at
32 (statement of Carson Holloway, Professor of Political Science, University of Nebraska at
Omaha) (stating the same bill ran afoul of the "principles of our free society" announced in
Pierce); Transcript of Public Hearing on Home Schooling Regulations: Hearing Before the
District of Columbia State Board of Education at 45 (Mar. 5, 2008) (statement of Jonathan
Zischkua, Chief Administrative Judge, District of Columbia Contract Appeals Board) (quoting
extensively from Troxel to oppose a proposed bill that required submission of a portfolio of
materials and state approval to homeschool), available at http://sboe.dc.gov/sboe/frames.asp
?doc=/sboellib/sboe/3-5-08_HomeSchoolRegulationsPublic.hearing-transcript.pdf.
287. Farrell, supra note 72 (quoting the bill's sponsor). Currently and at the relevant time
Montana effectively required only notice of intent to homeschool. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 20-5-102, -
109 (2009). See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
288. See, e.g., Montana Minutes, supra note 75, at 4 (testimony of Dewitt Black, Senior
Counsel, Home School Legal Defense Association) (stating that the bill violated "well-settled law"
under the Fourteenth Amendment); id. (testimony of Brian Ray, Ph.D., President, National
Home Education Research Institute), available at http://data.opi.mt.gov/legbills/2005/Minutes
/Senate/Exhibits/eds36alOO.PDF (claiming that the bill violates the Fourteen Amendment).
289. The legislation would have required standardized testing in three grades, registration of
children homeschooling, and monitors for the first two years for parents having only a high
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session, the bill's sponsor was the lone vote in favor of sending the bill
to the floor. 290
Timorous, misled, or misinformed legislators faced with the
Court's conflicting pronouncements face a situation "in which the
Constitution may provide guidance but does not provide rules."291
According to public choice theory, they may rationally adopt a
constitutional interpretation, regardless of whether it comports with
their own views, that is propounded by a vocal contingency of
constituents for whom absolute protection of a claimed constitutional
right to homeschool is a sine qua non.292 Further, legislators can
conveniently cloak a policy choice to leave homeschooling largely
unregulated in the inflated rhetoric with which the Court has
described the parental right. Relying on overblown constitutional
statements of rights, the precise nature and scope of which are likely
far narrower than they appear at first blush-but which even courts,
much less the public at large, do not fully comprehend-legislators can
duck the responsibility to implement legislation that protects the
interests of the state and homeschooled children and thereby avoid the
political costs that would inhere in doing so. 2 9 3
Indeed, at least two state homeschooling statutes, both the
subject of vigorous lobbying by homeschoolers, 294 declare it the
"primary right and obligation of the parent" to choose and provide for
school diploma or less. Quality Home School and Children Protection Act, S.B. 291, 54th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2005), available at http://data.opi.mt.gov/bills/2005/BillPDF/SBO291.pdf.
290. Minutes, Hearing on S.B. 291 Before the Montana S. Comm. on Educ. and Cultural Res.,
59th Leg., Reg. Sess. 8 (2005), available at http://data.opi.mt.gov/legbills/2005/Minutes
PDF/Senate/050214EDSSm1.pdf.
291. Keith E. Whittington, Herbert Wechsler's Complaint and the Revival of Grand
Constitutional Theory, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 509, 531 (2000).
292. See Tsvi Kahana, Legalism, Anxiety and Legislative Constitutionalism, 31 QUEEN'S L.J.
536, 564-66 (2006) (describing how legislators policy choices and personal interpretations of the
constitution can be warped by their prime directive of re-election); see also MARK TUSHNET,
TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 108 (1999) (noting that "politicians have
other incentives . . ., such as the desire for reelection, [that] may distort the politicians'
judgment" in interpreting the constitution); Reich, supra note 24, at 279-80 (describing as one of
the two primary factors responsible for fueling expansion of homeschooling the fact that "the
Yoder decision inspired many homeschool advocates to press their claims in state legislatures . .
a strategy which has yielded significant victories").
293. See Whittington, supra note 291, at 540 ("Risk aversion, combined with collective action
problems, may tend to keep some constitutional issues off the legislative agenda entirely.").
294. See KLICKA, supra note 2, at 160-63 (recounting the successful campaign, and its
constitutional dimensions, that resulted in the current Colorado homeschooling statute); Scott
W. Somerville, The Politics of Survival: Home Schoolers and the Law, http://www.
hslda.org/docs/nche/000010/PoliticsofSurvival.asp (last visited Jan. 30, 2010) (describing, in the
legislative victories section, the New Hampshire showdown, and ascribing a date showing this
indicates the current statute).
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the education of "a child under his care and supervision"295 -language
likely fashioned from the most regularly cited sections of several
Supreme Court cases. 296 The Court has noted on several occasions that
extension of due process protection to a liberty interest can "place the
matter outside the arena of public debate and legislative action."297
The employment of arch rhetoric to describe the parental right, even
though it imprecisely defines it, may have an equivalent political
impact.
Furthermore, the uncertainty surrounding homeschooling's
constitutional status may intensify the stake homeschoolers have in
legislative battles, thereby giving them an overwhelming
organizational advantage. As scholars have noted, redefining the
constitutional boundaries of family privacy or parental rights to
exclude certain groups inherently expresses a negative value
judgment of that group. 298 Homeschoolers view lower court decisions
refusing to recognize any constitutional dimension in their choices as
a kind of discriminatory persecution-denying them the constitutional
protections afforded specialized instruction or private school
decisionS299-for which redress must be sought in state legislatures. 300
295. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-33-104.5(1) (West 1998); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193:A
(2008).
296. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) ("It is cardinal with us that the
custody, care and nurture of the child reside first with the parents, whose primary function and
freedom include preparation for obligations the State can neither supply nor hinder."); Pierce v.
Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) ("The child is not the mere creature of the state; those
who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize
and prepare him for additional obligations." (emphasis added)); see also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 380.10 (West 2005) ("It is the natural, fundamental right of parents and legal guardians to
determine and direct the care, teaching, and education of their children.").
297. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997).
298. See Meyer, supra note 29, at 576 (suggesting the Court be more candid in its description
of privacy rights and analysis of claims to them to avoid "expressive regulation of the family"
that may have serious social ramifications).
299. See, e.g., Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35 (substantive due process protects parents' choice of
private schools); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-403 (1923) (parental rights prevent
prohibiting the choice of specialized instruction).
300. See CHRISTOPHER J. KLICKA, THE RIGHT TO HOME SCHOOL: A GUIDE TO THE LAW ON
PARENTS' RIGHTS IN EDUCATION 181-90 (3d ed. 2002) (providing a series of the Supreme Court's
more lofty descriptions of the parental rights and then outlining, with a clear tone of outrage, a
series of cases in which lower courts have "ignore[d] U.S. Supreme Court precedent"); id. at 203-
06 (describing Troxel in detail and stating that "[plarents battling oppressive state regulations
and invasions of their families have a clear decision which upholds their parental rights");
KLICKA, supra note 2, at 161 (recounting the lobbying battle to get the minimally restrictive
Colorado bill discussed in notes 295 and 296 and describing conversations with, and letters to,
legislators calling homeschoolers a " 'minority' who were being 'picked on' by the government");
id. at 168-69 (describing North Dakota "Bismarck Tea Party" of homeschoolers flooding the state
legislature because the Supreme Court of North Dakota refused to respect their constitutional
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While "parents have a constitutional right to send their children to
private schools and a constitutional right to select private schools that
offer specialized instruction,"301 homeschoolers can depend upon no
authoritative pronouncement of constitutional protection. They may
fear that even the slightest regulation is tantamount to elimination of
their ability to homeschool altogether, a choice they feel fundamental
to the well-being of their children. 302 Indeed, HSLDA Senior Counsel
Christopher Klicka has analogized any homeschooling regulation to
the creation of a "totally state-controlled educational system" in Nazi
Germany during the 1930s. 3 03 While the tenor of this rhetoric seems
highly exaggerated, it nonetheless indicates how the lack of clear
definition of homeschoolers' rights accentuates any perceived threats.
A clear statement of constitutional protection for some or all of their
decisions would quell these fears and may, in turn, help rectify the
asymmetry in lobbying power that has resulted in such low levels of
regulation in many states.
D. The Yoder Problem
The uncertainty surrounding the continuing precedential value
of Yoder, either as an instance of a hybrid-rights situation involving
the conjunction of parental and free exercise rights or on its own
merits, presents many of the same issues addressed in the preceding
sections as well as its own particular set of problems. Lower courts
continue to recognize Yoder's employment of strict scrutiny.304 Yet
those who reject the hybrid-rights claim provide no alternative theory
rights, leaving them "suffering under the chains" of strict regulation without the "consent of the
governed"; "[t]he Legislature wouldn't move to 'let my people go.' ").
301. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 178 (1976).
302. See, e.g., Prevention and Treatment of Child Abuse and Neglect: Policy Directions for the
Future, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Select Educ. of the H. Comm. on Educ. and the
Workforce, 107th Cong. 10-13, 21-24, app. D, at 81-99 (statement of Christopher J. Klicka,
Senior Counsel, Home School Legal Defense Association), available at http://frwebgate.access.
gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_househearings&docid=f:80041.pdf (describing how
proposed reauthorization and extension of the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act would
infringe on the constitutional rights of parents and homeschooling parents in particular); see also
140 CONG. REC. 18,660-703 (1994) (transcribing the confirmation hearing of Justice Stephen
Breyer, during which no fewer than eight senators directly asked his views on, as Senator
Pressler put it, whether "it would be constitutional for a State government to ban home
schooling" based upon concerns expressed about Breyer's judicial record raised by their
homeschooling constituents).
303. KLICKA, supra note 2, at 46-48.
304. See, e.g., Combs v. Homer-Ctr. Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d 231, 250-51 (3d Cir. 2008) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1013 (2009) (not disputing Yoder's continued validity, but
contending homeschooling parents' claims were readily distinguishable).
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upon which use of that standard would rest.305 If parents homeschool
and choose their curricula on the basis of sincerely held religious
beliefs, 306 no court has developed an analytically coherent rationale to
explain why their rights should be entitled to any lesser protection
than Yoder's Amish.307 An estimated 1.3 million students, fully 83
percent of the homeschooling population, are homeschooled for
religious reasons. 308 Consequently, the existence of a special category
of constitutional claims for religious homeschoolers is of particular
importance to legislators, homeschooling parents, students, and the
general public.
Nonetheless, there are clear differences between the Yoder
decision's exemption of the Amish from a mere two years of secondary
education, subject to reasonable quality-assurance regulations, 309 and
the claims made by homeschoolers. 310 Justice White made explicit the
limits of the Yoder holding in his concurrence: "This would be a very
different case for me if respondents' claim were that their religion
forbade their children from attending any school at any time and from
complying in any way with the educational standards set by the
State."311 Further, any legal distinction in treatment based upon
whether homeschooling is religiously motivated could violate the
Establishment Clause or the Equal Protection Clause. 312 Yet several
305. See, e.g., id. at 252 (stating that the religiously-based parental liberty interest to
homeschool free from required government approval was distinct from Yoder, but providing no
basis beyond factual differences).
306. See, e.g., id. at 234 (accepting as legitimate parents' "religious belief that 'education of
their children, not merely the religious education, is religion' and that God has assigned religious
matters to the exclusive jurisdiction of the family").
307. See generally, Recent Case, Constitutional Law-Due Process, Right to Privacy and Free
Exercise-First Circuit Denies Parents a Constitutional Right to Prevent Children From
Receiving School-Sponsored AIDS Education: Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc., 110 HARV.
L. REV. 1179, 1179-84 (1987) (arguing the First Circuit misconstrued Yoder, Pierce, and Meyer
such that factual distinctions of little analytical significance became the basis for a doctrinally
unsound holding that parents' religious objections were not constitutionally protected).
308. See BIELICK, supra note 19, at 2-3 (estimating that there are 1.5 million homeschoolers
in the United States and noting that in 2007, based upon an NHES survey, the percentage of
students whose parents cited religious or moral instruction as the reason for homeschooling was
83 percent).
309. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235-36 (1976).
310. See, e.g., Combs, 540 F.3d at 249-51 (noting that parents were claiming full exemption
from any state oversight of educational programs administered at home).
311. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 238 (White, J., concurring). Note also that this concurrence was
joined by two other Justices and, because Justices Powell and Rehnquist took no part in the
determination, would have garnered a majority with Justice Douglas, who dissented on grounds
suggesting he would agree with this limitation. Id. at 236-37, 241-43.
312. See Michael Kavey, Note, Private Voucher Schools and the First Amendment Right to
Discriminate, 113 YALE L.J. 743, 779 (2003) (stating that, if rights are provided "a higher degree
of protection when . . . religiously motivated, then [that] would seem to put religious actors in a
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state legislatures, presumably attuned to the possible constitutional
distinctions between religious homeschoolers and the minority of other
homeschoolers, have provided special statutory accommodations for
religious homeschoolers, at times exempting them entirely from all
oversight. 313 However, if regulations are aimed at preventing parent-
teachers from teaching material "manifestly inimical to the public
welfare"314 or providing substantively inferior education to female
children 315 based upon idiosyncratic but otherwise genuine religious
beliefs, heightened constitutional protection for religiously motivated
homeschoolers may exempt some of the very children most at risk.
Hence, the Supreme Court's failure to clearly articulate the
doctrinal bases, scope, and protections to be accorded the parental
right alone or when conjoined with the right to free exercise has left
the constitutional landscape murky, infirm, and deeply problematic. 316
At one pole, the current standards leave homeschooling, an
educational method with demonstrated benefits, beneath a legal
sword of Damocles. At the other, they threaten to evict the state from
any say whatsoever in the fulfillment of what has rightly been called
its "most important function"317-education-with respect to an
increasingly large portion of its children, and to remove from children
any voice in determinations that will decide the future courses of their
lives. 318 Additionally, the mismatch between the Court's exalting
rhetoric and its practical pragmatism serves to enhance gridlock in
the political debate about re-regulating homeschooling. Without
constitutionally favored position, in possible violation of the Establishment Clause and the Equal
Protection Clause").
313. See, e.g., VA CODE ANN. §§ 22.1-254(B)(1), 22.1-254.1(D) (West 2009) (excusing "[any
pupil who, together with his parents, by reason of bona fide religious training or belief" from
compliance with reporting, minimum qualifications, and standardized testing requirements
applicable to other homeschoolers).
314. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925); see, e.g., T.A.F. v. Duval County, 273
So. 2d 15, 18 (Fla. App. 1973) (per curiam) (discussed supra note 160 and accompanying text).
315. See, e.g., Yuracko, supra note 17, at 156-68 (cataloging a few examples of
homeschooling parents who, based upon religious beliefs that education was spiritually
dangerous for women, provided significantly inferior education to homeschooled girls and
arguing state permission of this could violate the Equal Protection Clause).
316. Meyer, supra note 29, at 545 ("[The Court's parental-rights cases remain profoundly
murky regarding the balance they strike between private and communal interests in
childrearing . . . ."); see also Reich, supra note 24, at 286-96 (contending that a religious
exemption or plenary parental rights would have marked deleterious impacts on the interests of
the state and the child).
317. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
318. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 US. 205, 244-45 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("It is the
student's judgment, not his parents', that is essential if we are to give full meaning to what we




clarification, the prospects of dealing with the sensitive social,
familial, personal, and political issues inherent in the practice of
homeschooling seem dim.
V. TEACH (Y)OUR CHILDREN WELL: A PROPOSAL
States have undertaken a remarkable deregulation of
homeschooling as an educational alternative over the last twenty-five
years, 319 largely as a consequence of the organizational prowess of the
homeschooling lobby. To address the problems outlined above, states
should reexamine their homeschooling regulations, a process that has
already begun in some places. Attempts to move toward re-regulation
face monumental challenges, but these challenges are not
insurmountable if the constitutional uncertainty is lessened and the
political imbalance ameliorated. Candor in defining the scope and
nature of parental rights would set a clearer constitutional backdrop,
free of the distortions caused by the "rhetorical clout of rights talk,"320
and foster a political process for formulating sensible and balanced
homeschooling regulations.321 Similarly, elimination of the apparent
disparity in the constitutional standards applicable based upon
whether homeschooling is religiously motivated would allow states to
formulate uniform regulations, rather than conferring special status
on religious homeschoolers.
Homeschooling has proven to be a viable educational
alternative with real and substantial benefits for many students and
one that an increasingly large proportion of the population chooses.
The choices parents make to homeschool their children deserve the
same constitutional protections afforded parents who choose to send
their children to private schools or German lessons. The availability of
that choice promotes salutary diversity in viewpoint and experience.
Yet, just as there is little question as to the constitutionality of
319. See Yuracko, supra note 17, at 128-30 (describing the remarkable downward trend in
homeschool regulations creating laws that, in some instances, leave "oversight ... so lax as to be
nonexistent").
320. Woodhouse, supra note 40, at 484-45.
321. The idea that the Court should be attuned to and act to counteract the existence of
defects in the political process is far from novel. See Elhauge, supra note 281, at 44-46 (outlining
the alterations to the process of judicial review advocated by multiple scholars and theorists of
the public choice and interest group theory schools); see also STEPHEN G. BREYER, ACTIVE
LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 27-34 (2006) ("[W~e can find in the
Constitution's structural complexity an effort to produce a form of democracy that would prevent
any single group of individuals from exercising too much power, helping to protect an
individual's (modern) fundamental liberty." "[T]his constitutional understanding helps interpret
the Constitution. . . .").
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required accreditation, core curricular requirements, and forms of
assurance that minimum numbers of hours are spent in the classroom
in private schools, 322 states should similarly be assured of clear
constitutional authority to protect their " 'paramount' interest in
education"323 and compelling interests in the health, safety, and well-
being of their homeschooled youth. 324
A parent's choice to send her children to private school or to
enroll her child in a course of specialized instruction are
constitutionally protected exercises of a fundamental liberty interest
in the education and upbringing of those children.325 Similarly, courts
should state unequivocally that the parental right to choose home
education and choose subjects taught in that context is an exercise of a
fundamental liberty interest protected by strict scrutiny under the
Due Process Clause. 326 However, such a determination should make
clear that the protected liberty is binary: absolute deprivation of
choice would infringe on parental rights, but adding requirements to
the parental obligation while not precluding the choice to homeschool
or to teach certain matters would not be.3 27 Similarly, regulations that
322. See, e.g., Eric A. DeGroff, State Regulation of Nonpublic Schools: Does the Tie Still
Bind?, 2003 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 363, 381-97 (detailing a comprehensive survey of state regulatory
regimes for private schools and cases establishing their constitutionality).
323. Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 431 (2006)
(quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213, 221 (1972)).
324. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 407 (2007) (recognizing states' "important-
indeed, perhaps compelling" interest in deterring drug use as necessary to protecting "the health
and well-being of young people"); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221 (suggesting that, at least "in the
generality of cases," the state's interests in protecting the "physical or mental health of the child"
and preserving "the welfare of the child and society as a whole" will be sufficiently compelling to
justify regulation to those ends); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) ("[N]either
rights of religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond limitation. Acting to guard the general
interest in youth's well being, the state as parens patriae may restrict the parent's control . . . in
many ... ways.").
325. See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 178 (1976) ("The Court has repeatedly
stressed that . .. parents have a constitutional right to send their children to private schools and
a constitutional right to select private schools that offer specialized instruction . . . ."); Hutchins
v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 540-41 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (gleaning from the Court's
pronouncements in the Meyer-Pierce- Yoder line of substantive due process cases the idea that the
parent's "fundamental right" includes "controlling . . . the formal education of children").
326. Substantive due process analysis that focuses on the effect of governmental regulation
solely upon choice itself is not without precedent. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877-78 (1992) (setting forth the undue burden standard for analysis of
abortion regulations under the substantive due process clause under which state actions that
have the purpose or effect of foreclosing the right to make the ultimate decision are
unconstitutional but regulations designed to further legitimate state interests that do not
impinge upon the "right of choice" are not).
327. Some lower courts already seem to have come to a similar conclusion in other
educational contexts. See, e.g., Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197, 1205-06 (9th Cir.
2005) (stating that the parental right should properly be read to confer on parents the right to
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effectively foreclose the opportunity to homeschool to a large
proportion of parents, such as requiring that parent-teachers be
certified teachers or hold a bachelor's degree, would undergo rigorous
scrutiny, requiring the state show that they are necessary to the
protection of compelling interests in education or child welfare.
Such a rule would ensure that parents are free to transfer their
beliefs, even if socially unpopular or idiosyncratic, to their children,
preserving educational choice as a crucial bulwark of liberalism. 328
Parents could opt to convey their values to their children via
homeschooling in a way that otherwise may be unavailable through
the institutional educational alternatives in a family's location.
Protecting homeschooling parents' basic decisions in this fashion also
should eliminate some of homeschoolers' concerns that their ability to
make basic educational choices, which many view as crucial to their
family identities, hang in the balance at every hearing on a new
homeschooling regulation. 329
Some have instead advocated an intermediate form of review
that would allow balancing of state and parental interests in all
educational decisions. 330 However, such a standard would do little to
mitigate the unpredictability of decisions under the current, uncertain
constitutional doctrine. Consequently, it would do little to alleviate the
fears of homeschoolers and the constitutional concerns of legislators
that have distorted the political debate over homeschooling regulation.
Simultaneously, courts should make clear that the state's
interest in ensuring the provision of an adequate education and
preventing children from "becom[ing] burdens on society because of
educational shortcomings" 331 is compelling in the constitutional sense.
inform their children in any way they wish, but not prevent states from requiring they be
provided with additional information); Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 533
(1st Cir. 1995) ("The Meyer and Pierce cases, we think, evince the principle that the state cannot
prevent parents from choosing a specific educational program-whether it be religious
instruction at a private school or instruction in a foreign language. . . . We do not think, however,
that this freedom encompasses a fundamental constitutional right to dictate the curriculum ...
328. See, e.g., William A. Galston, Two Concepts of Liberalism, 105 ETHICS 516, 528 (1995)
("Toleration means ... the principled refusal to use coercive state instruments to impose one's
own views on others, the commitment to competition through recruitment and persuasion
alone.").
329. See, e.g., Christopher J. Klicka, Homeschooling Under Fire Around the Country (From
the Trenches), PRACTICAL HOMESCHOOLING, Jan. 2005, at 19, 20 (describing how the Montana
bill-described supra notes 70-75, 144-45, 288-91 and accompanying text-would "prohibit]
homeschooling by step-parents and legal guardians!" despite there being no clear language
suggesting as much in the bill).
330. See, e.g., Meyer, supra note 29, at 575-76 (arguing in favor of such a standard).
331. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 224 (1972). Note that the Court saw as crucial to
rejection of this point, argued by the state against exemption of the Amish from compulsory
590 [Vol. 63:2:541
BRINGING IT ALL BACK HOME
The Supreme Court has stated that, while parents have fundamental
liberty interests in the upbringing of their children, these can be
overridden, even to the point of deprivation of custody, by the state's
parens patrie interests in child welfare, given sufficient evidence of
neglect or abuse. 332 Similarly, courts should make explicit that when
homeschooling monitoring mechanisms uncover similarly "clear and
convincing"333 evidence of abuse, neglect (educational or otherwise), or
substantially unequal learning opportunities, the state has authority
to override parents' choices and possibly require that children be sent
to institutional schools. This should obviate concerns raised by some
that overly stringent constitutional protections of the decision to
homeschool may allow intransigent parents to provide seriously
inferior educations, no education at all, or unequal educations to their
male and female children.334
Further, states should be able to put in place procedures to
adjudicate disputes between the educational desires of parents and
students. If such procedures determine that the parent's choice
hinders or forecloses the student's educational goals, states should be
permitted to order such additional education, even outside the home,
as necessary to accommodate the student's ambitions. Generally, an
order to allow for or provide additional education under such a system
would not necessarily deprive parents of any choice, but would simply
require that additional elements be incorporated into a student's
education. However, even if a ruling overrode parental choice, courts
should hold that such procedures and the determinations they make
serve a compelling state interest "in seeking to develop the latent
talents of its children [and] in seeking to prepare them for the life
style that they may later choose . . . ."335 If an order directing that a
student be placed in a school of some variety were necessary to
provide the student with education essential to her goals as uncovered
education laws, the fact that "the Amish accept the necessity for formal schooling through the
eighth grade level [and] provide . . . an 'ideal' vocational education for their children in the
adolescent years." Id.
332. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48, 759 (1982) (requiring a state to
provide "clear and convincing evidence," but not questioning its authority to absolutely sever the
parent-child relationship in a neglect proceeding).
333. See id. (requiring "clear and convincing" evidence in deprivation of custody
circumstances).
334. See, e.g., Yuracko, supra note 17, at 132-33 (discussed supra Part II.B.1).
335. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 240 (White, J., concurring). As mentioned supra note 311, it seems
there was a majority of the Justices who took part in the Yoder determination in favor of
allowing States to overcome even the undefined higher level of scrutiny that might come from a
coupling of parental and free exercise claims for this purpose.
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by such a process, then the expression of the student's goals, coupled
with the compelling state interest, should survive strict scrutiny.
The described standard also would be directly applicable to the
situation at issue in Yoder, thereby harmonizing that decision with
other educational rights cases and eliminating the necessity for a
unique (and uncertain) standard of review based upon the religious
motivations of homeschoolers. 336 Religiously motivated homeschoolers
would remain protected against discriminatory treatment by the
general standard for free exercise claims, which requires that state
actions specifically directed at religious activities survive strict
scrutiny. 337 Providing homeschool education could thereby be governed
by uniform, generally applicable regulations. because it is not
objectively and universally an instance of religious expression.
Parents' choice to educate their children consistent with their religious
convictions simply would be a specialized, subjective iteration of the
parental right to choose how to educate their children, to which states
later could add further curricular requirements. Consequently, courts
should outline the standard so as to make clear that the choices of
religiously motivated homeschoolers are afforded the same
constitutional protections as other educational choices, but have no
special constitutional status.338
The concomitant standard for regulations that do not foreclose
free choice, then, would merely require that they be rationally related
to the state's interests in education and child welfare. They would be
presumptively constitutional absent an affirmative showing that the
regulations could not possibly further those interests. 339 If the
touchstone of a parent's fundamental liberty interest in her child's
education is choice among educational alternatives, regulations that
merely add requirements and do not prevent the teaching of other
subjects by means parents choose would not infringe upon those
336. Specifically, the Amish in Yoder could be ensured their choices to school their children
at home would be protected by a stringent standard of review under the Due Process Clause.
337. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 513-14 (1997) (describing and affirming the
"neutral, generally applicable" standard governing free exercise claims).
338. This standard is not meant to define the substantive policy choices a state may make in,
for example, ensuring that homeschooling parents do not provide higher quality education to
males than females. Rather, it is intended to create a clearly defined sphere in which states can
set regulatory policy consistent with the will of their people. Just as state regulations that forbid
teaching rhetoric could impermissibly foreclose a homeschooling parent's choice to teach that
subject absent demonstration of a compelling interest and a least restrictive means, so too
regulations that forbid teaching in line with a parent's religious beliefs would be invalid unless
required to serve one of the compelling interests enumerated in the preceding two paragraphs.
339. See RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, 2 TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE & PROCEDURE § 15.5 (4th ed. 2007) (describing the rational basis standard of review).
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choices. This would allow states with concerns over educational
quality or breadth to impose curricular requirements or require
regular testing or other types of evaluation. States with concerns that
parents may teach, for example, supremacist ideologies or may refuse
to teach female children could thereby counteract, to a degree, the
dangers those practices pose by requiring that they be supplemented
by contrary views. As repugnant as sexist, racist, or separatist
teaching may be to the public at large, refusal to prohibit the diffusion
of such ideas is among the commitments of a liberal, pluralistic
society. If a state could impose curricular requirements that contrary
perspectives be taught simultaneously (and enforced by testing or
other means of oversight),340 the differences between a homeschooler
being inculcated with these ideas and a public school student being
taught them in the evenings would be minimized.341 Moreover, in
extreme instances the state could override the parents' educational
choices if they refused to abide by these curricular requirements in a
fashion "manifestly inimical to the public welfare"342 or taught in a
way that amounted to educational neglect.
State monitoring mechanisms, like home visits or educational
evaluations by independent personnel, also would lie outside of the
scope of the liberty interest protected by strict scrutiny under this
proposal.343 As these types of requirements would not, in and of
340. As an example, state science testing might assess a homeschool student's familiarity
with the basic tenets of evolutionary theory, astronomy, or psychology if the state made the
policy choice that students exclusively taught material contrary to the generally accepted
principles of these disciplines should be exposed to other perspectives. States could further
similar policy objectives by requiring that homeschooled students regularly have conversations
with designated educational officials who could evaluate a student's familiarity with a variety of
viewpoints, perhaps on political or social subject matters. In so doing, the state need not impose
a viewpoint, which would be unquestionably unconstitutional, but ensure that homeschoolers are
given opportunities to appraise information with which they disagree and discuss it cogently. See
generally Reich, supra note 24, at 307 (stating that "education that promotes [a child's] critical
thinking and capacities for reflection on their own and others' ends" is "necessary for citizenship"
and in "the interests both of the child and of the state").
341. This type of requirement may raise constitutional free speech problems that are beyond
the scope of this Note. However, if parents are performing a surrogate public function, see supra
part II.B.1, that might render such curricular requirements beyond the scope of First
Amendment speech protections. In any event, these requirements could be made (as they are for
public and some private schools) part of the compulsory attendance laws, such that criminal
truancy sanctions would attach for ignoring them. It may also be the case that these types of
requirements would be necessary to protect the state's compelling interests in children receiving
an adequate, civically beneficial education such that homeschooling choices could be conditioned
on agreement to abide by them in a fashion consistent with strict scrutiny, obviating at least
some of the constitutional concerns.
342. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925).
343. See, e.g., id. ("No question is raised concerning the power of the state reasonably to
regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise and examine them, their teachers and pupils . . . .").
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:2:541
themselves, preclude parents from making any educational choices,
but merely add additional obligations, they would be accorded a
presumption of constitutionality. 344 Such mechanisms could lessen
concerns that parents may use homeschooling as a cover for abuse.
They would also afford states a clear means by which to discover and
deal with situations in which the public interest in the education and
welfare of students is being flouted.345 Visits or evaluations also could
help counteract socialization concerns by ensuring that homeschooling
children, who might otherwise be completely isolated, engage in some
degree of interaction with those outside of the home. 346
Defining the parental right so as to grant regulations of these
varieties presumptive validity is far from radical and, indeed, seems
well in line with several statements of the Supreme Court. 347 Full
candor in defining the parameters of the parental right and the
flexibility states have to regulate both inside and outside of those
parameters could have a salutary effect on transparency in the
political process. Legislators would no longer be able to abdicate their
duty to consider and to enact, where necessary, further homeschooling
regulation by hiding behind broad pronouncements of parental rights
344. Such provisions could raise Fourth Amendment concerns, but these concerns could be
obviated by conditioning approval of a homeschooling program on waiver of the right in the
limited instance of home visits. See Yuracko, supra note 17, at 153 ("[I]ndividuals may waive
their Fourth Amendment right to be free from . . . searches and seizures."). More importantly,
such concerns are beyond the scope of this Note.
345. Additionally, the state could impose and enforce, for example, immunization
requirements, and failure to comply would then implicate the state's compelling interest in child
welfare, which could then overcome strict scrutiny to override the parents' choice to homeschool.
See generally Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-71 (1944) (holding that the state's
interest in child welfare could, in extreme instances, overcome both free exercise and parental
rights claims).
346. Cf. Reich, supra note 24, at 300 (arguing that even minimal "informal opportunities to
engage with difference" may be sufficient to prevent social isolation and ethical servility and
thereby relieving some, if not all, of the socialization concerns homeschooling implicates). See
generally MEIRA LEVINSON, THE DEMANDS OF LIBERAL EDUCATION 57-63 (2002) (contending that
interaction with places and persons "separate from the environment in which children are
raised" are imperative elements of social, educational, and political development).
347. See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 178 (1976) ("The Court has repeatedly
stressed that while parents have a constitutional right to send their children to private schools
and a constitutional right to select private schools that offer specialized instruction, they have no
constitutional right to provide their children with private school education unfettered by
reasonable government regulation."); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972) ('There is no
doubt as to the power of a State, having a high responsibility for education of its citizens, to
impose reasonable regulations for the control and duration of basic education."); Prince, 321 U.S.
at 166 ("Acting to guard the general interest in youth's well being, the state as parens patriae
may restrict the parent's control by requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the
child's labor, and in many other ways."); Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534 (allowing far reaching
regulations protective of the public welfare and interests of the child while holding that the
choice to send children to a private school could not be infringed upon).
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that obscure their practical scope. 348 Doctrinal clarification from the
Supreme Court may ultimately be the only way to fully vitiate the
obstructive rhetorical force of assertions of absolute constitutional
rights that have cowed legislators and skewed public debate. While a
statement from the Court would be ideal, however, lower courts too
can and should apply this constitutional framework. It is both
consistent with Supreme Court precedent and more doctrinally and
analytically consistent than reading the Due Process and Free
Exercise Clauses to provide little or no protection to homeschooling.
Moreover, even without an authoritative Supreme Court definition of
the metes and bounds of the constitutional protections attached to
homeschooling, lower court decisions adopting this framework would
provide sound precedent as a backdrop against which legislators and
interested groups could interact with relative certainty.
It may be that even as the homeschooling population of a state
continues to grow and diversify, legislators will remain convinced that
minimal or no regulation is in the best interests of their constituents.
But clearing the constitutional haze surrounding homeschooling
would help ensure that they own those decisions. Clear enumeration
of the narrow, constitutionally compelling circumstances under which
a state could order a child to be schooled in an institutional setting349
would help alleviate both the fears of homeschooling parents and
concerns that homeschooling could be used as a cover for abuse,
educational neglect, or deprivation of the opportunity for a student to
choose her own path in life.35 0 Further, candid clarification that
348. See, e.g., Hearing on S.B. 276 Before the S. Comm. on Educ. and Cultural Res., 58th
Leg., Reg. Sess. 20 (Mont. 2003) (recounting the debate on Senator Ryan's homeschooling re-
regulation, during which Democratic Senator Mangan "stated his appreciation for Sen. Ryan's
efforts, but noted he [was] concerned with the constitutionality of the bill"), available at
http://data.opi.mt.govfbills/2003/MinutesPDF/030210EDS-Sml.pdf; see also supra notes 70-72
and accompanying text.
349. This would heighten the standard announced in such cases as Hanson v. Cushman, 490
F. Supp. 109, 114-15 (W.D. Mich. 1980) ("Thus the state need not demonstrate a 'compelling
interest' but only that it acted 'reasonably' in requiring children to attend school and that
children be taught only by certified teachers.").
350. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233-34 ('To be sure the power of the parent . . . may be subject to
limitation . . . if it appears that parental decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of the
child, or have a potential for significant social burdens."); id. at 240 (White, J., concurring) ("A
State has a legitimate interest not only in seeking to develop the latent talents of its children but
also in seeking to prepare them for the life style that they may later choose, or at least to provide
them with an option . . . ."); id. at 242 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (stating that if the parents are
able to effectively impose their views upon children, "it would be an invasion of the child's rights"
if states were unable to provide an effective mechanism for the child to choose otherwise). Clear
enunciation of these interests could eliminate contentious and constitutionally questionable
decisions such as that in a recent New Hampshire case that elicited national press. Joshua Rhett
Miller, Group Asks Court to Reconsider Removing Girl From Home School, Fox NEWS.COM, Sept.
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regulations protecting the public's interests and the homeschooled
student's interests are presumptively constitutional unless they
effectively foreclose a parent's choice to homeschool or teach certain
subjects would force state legislators to accept accountability for the
decision not to regulate. With overblown statements of constitutional
right and undercooked, doctrinally unsound declarations of a lack of
constitutional implications taken off the bargaining table, a rational
debate about the appropriate level of regulation can more readily
occur.
VI. CONCLUSION
For much of the last decade, homeschooling around the country
has been subject to little or no regulation. Until recently, it seemed
unlikely that the trend toward deregulation would reverse.351
Nonetheless, the drawbacks of an unregulated segment of the
education system have reinvigorated the political debate about a more
sensible level of homeschooling regulation.352 The twenty-four states
that currently require only that parents give notice of their intent to
homeschool or no notice at all 35 3 should enact legislation to protect the
health and well-being of homeschooled children and to ensure that
they receive an education that will allow them to become productive
citizens. The states that have varying degrees of testing and
evaluation requirements should reexamine their current stance to
ensure that their oversight sufficiently protects children and furthers
1, 2009, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,545340,00.html. In that case, a New Hampshire
family court judge ordered a mother who had homeschooled her daughter for most of the child's
academic career to send her to a public school based upon the father's contentions and Guardian
ad Litem findings that her schooling, largely based upon her mother's "rigid" religious beliefs,
hampered her intellectual and social development. In re Kurowski, No. 2006-M-669, (N.H. Fam.
Ct., Laconia Div. July 13, 2009), available at http://www.nhfamilylawblog.com/stats/pepper
/orderedlist/downloads/download.php?file=http%3A//www.nhfamilylawblog.com/uploads/file/Kuro
wskiOrder.pdf. This case will undoubtedly be appealed and has created a furor rife with
constitutional uncertainty. Miller, supra. Clarification of the limited interests upon which such a
decision could issue would mitigate the public outcry, give the judge far greater guidance in
making a determination, and clarify the constitutional basis, if any, of both parents' claims.
351. See Yuracko, supra note 17, at 128-30 (describing the longstanding trend toward
deregulation and predicting that this trend would continue).
352. See, e.g., H.B. 69, 26th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Alaska 2009) (providing, in a recently
introduced bill, for voluntary home visits for homeschooled children under the age of five); S.B.
472, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009) (changing current homeschooling law to require
notification of intent to homeschool and periodic testing of homeschoolers).
353. See Yurako, supra note 17, at 129-30 (outlining the current legal landscape of
homeschooling regulations).
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their interests in an educated citizenry.354 Both groups of states
should engage in realistic debate about the reliability of enforcement
mechanisms for any regulation they might impose.355
Courts, and ideally the Supreme Court, also have a critical role
to play in fostering this dialogue. They should clarify the nature of the
parental rights implicated by homeschooling regulation to allow this
political process to function naturally and should provide
homeschoolers unequivocal protection for their choice of educational
alternative and curriculum, regardless of their motivations. This
determination should make clear the scope of the parental rights
under the Constitution by abandoning overbroad rights language and
bringing above board the pragmatic accommodation of the multiple
interests that, indeed, seems to be the true standard in practice. Doing
so will tone down the pitch of the political conversation by reassuring
homeschoolers that their bedrock decisions will be protected. Also, this
determination would likely work to correct the imbalance between
those interested in the impact on children and the public welfare of
unregulated homeschooling and those who advocate for minimal or no
regulations. It will also remove legislators' incentives to adopt the
constitutional interpretations of homeschooling interest groups and
remove from the debate any ability they may have to claim their
hands are tied. Legislators should not be able to avoid responsibility
for any harm or disservice resulting from overly lax regulations by
relying upon exaggerated pronouncements of constitutional rights.
With this clear constitutional backdrop in place, a reasoned and
deliberative dialogue about how homeschooling ought to be regulated
can occur and the trend toward more balanced homeschooling
regulations that protect the interests of parents, children, and the
public alike can, perhaps, bear fruit.
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354. See id. at 128-29 ("[O]nly twenty-five states presently require standardized testing and
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